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ABSTRACT 
 
 My thesis is titled “Modeling the Public Intellectual: The Case of Matthew 
Arnold.”  Matthew Arnold, arguably “the most influential critic of his age” (Trilling 190) 
has also proven to be an influential model for the public intellectual currently in Canada 
and elsewhere.  The role and work of public intellectuals is complex and who or what 
they are is the topic of vigorous debate and sometimes extreme disagreement.  Because 
Arnold is so influential and controversial as a literary and social critic, I want to develop 
and to communicate a better understanding of his achievements and to explore the 
connection between his work and the role of the public intellectual.  To that end, I draw 
on three of his works, “The Function of Criticism at the Present Time” (1864), Culture 
and Anarchy (1869) and Literature and Dogma (1873).  In the course of a decade, Arnold 
asserts and expands the role of criticism in society and the kinds of issues a poet, critic, 
and inspector of schools feels competent to address while defining his own personal 
version of “the Victorian Sage” (Holloway).  I also want to explore why criticism 
produced in the nineteenth century, particularly in Arnold’s work, promotes the figure 
and activities of the public intellectual.  Moreover, I will reaffirm, via Arnold’s example, 
the importance of the relationship between literature and life and show how this 
connection nourishes the idea of the public intellectual in the English-speaking world. 
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Matthew Arnold, arguably “the most influential critic of his age” (Trilling 190) 
has also proven to be an influential model for the public intellectual currently in Canada 
and elsewhere, especially in the areas of education and literary studies (Murray 74-5).  
Moreover, in Seed-Bed Robbins concedes that there is a “continuing emphasis on the 
modern relevance of Arnold’s ideas” (Bloom 74).  The role of public intellectuals is 
complex and who or what they are is the topic of vigorous debate and sometimes extreme 
disagreement (Posner 2).  Because Arnold is so influential and controversial as a literary 
and social critic, I want to develop and to communicate a better understanding of his 
achievements and to explore the connection between his work and the role of the public 
intellectual.  To that end, I will draw on three of his works, “The Function of Criticism at 
the Present Time” (1864), Culture and Anarchy (1869), and Literature and Dogma 
(1873).  In the course of a decade, Arnold asserts and expands the role of criticism in 
society and the kinds of issues a poet, critic, and inspector of schools feels competent to 
address while defining his own personal version of “the Victorian Sage” (Holloway).   
I would like to note here the implications of my title, and the resonance of the 
term “modelling.”  The Oxford English Dictionary Online defines modelling as “the 
action of bringing something to a desired or desirable form or condition; the fact of being 
artistically modelled or shaped so as to appear lifelike; the action or process of eliciting a 
mode of behaviour by example.”  I will argue that Matthew Arnold, in his insistence on 
the importance of criticism and culture and his connection of literature to life, illustrates 
some of each definition.  Indeed, with language as his tool, he models a function for 
criticism and culture.  This function is carried through his later works as Arnold engages 
in the process of social and literary criticism while simultaneously eliciting a mode of 
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behaviour by example.  Therefore, I also want to explore why criticism produced in the 
nineteenth-century, particularly in Arnold’s work, promotes the figure and activities of 
the public intellectual.  Moreover, I will reaffirm, via Arnold’s example, the importance 
of the relationship between literature and life and show how this connection nourishes the 
idea of the public intellectual in the English-speaking world. 
 In order to understand Arnold’s work and his contribution to the role of the public 
intellectual we must first consider the personal, religious, social, cultural, and political 
climates in which he matured.  Arnold is not a free-standing monolith; indeed, his 
thought and theories are greatly influenced by many people and movements.  One of 
these very important influences was his father, an educated, dutifully religious, socially 
concerned Rugby headmaster, who had “an enthusiasm for…poetry and…Tory politics” 
(Trilling 40).  Thomas Arnold had a devotion to history (as it helped confirm his faith) 
and was charmed by neither dogma nor logic (Trilling 41).  When he married and had 
children, his home was the center of frequent visits and stimulating intellectual 
conversation.  His appointment at Rugby “was the beginning of Arnold’s public 
career…[and] throughout [these] years Thomas Arnold was a leader in the religious and 
political conflict in England, the conflict between the old and the new” (Trilling 45-46).  
For Arnold senior, the Church had an important function, the social improvement of man 
and woman, and he argued that social action, not dogma, would save the Church (Trilling 
48).  He was a reformer, hating anarchy and revolution, and shared in an ideal of the State 
whose “essence is power [and whose] aim is human good” (Trilling 53).  He desired a 
unifying faith—an idea that had its benefits as well as its complications—in which the 
term “Christian” was common to all and he shaped “his” school with the view that 
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“secular education was a contradiction in terms” (Trilling 64).  Despite his “liberal” 
views on the role of Christianity and the Church of England, Dr. Arnold had quite 
traditionally conservative views of moral reform and the kind of instruction Rugby 
should offer.  He received the highest respect from his students while maintaining the 
highest expectations with regard to their moral and intellectual development.  Dr. Arnold, 
however, also had high expectations of himself as teacher: “Intellectually, as well as 
morally, he felt that the teacher ought himself to be perpetually learning, and so 
constantly above the level of his scholars” (Stanley 147).  His desire was that Rugby 
would become a place of Christian education but with the practical aim of applying 
Christian values to the students’ everyday lives.  As Stanley suggests, Arnold’s education 
was “not based upon religion, but was itself religious” (110 emphasis his).  Rugby school 
became a sort of microcosm of society, and to many it signified “the spirit of upper 
middle class England at its best” (Trilling 73).     
In 1841 Dr. Arnold senior accepted the Regius Professorship of Modern History 
at Oxford and he continued to believe, perhaps even more fully than ever, that “in History 
truth was attainable and that…History would clear the way to faith” (Trilling 74).  
Redemptive history for the father would become redemptive criticism for the son.  
Matthew Arnold recognized the limitations of history considered simply as information.  
Only when criticism is applied to historical information, when it is analyzed, put into 
context, when it is seen from all sides, can truth and faith be truly attainable.  Matthew 
Arnold’s youth was spent watching his strong, authoritative father function in several 
different roles and he watched him express strong political, religious, and social 
criticisms.  Dr. Arnold desired for the individual to grow, to strive for perfection and this 
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sentiment is well captured in a letter from Mr. Price regarding Dr. Arnold’s character.  
“Dr. Arnold’s great power as a private tutor resided in this, that he gave such an intense 
earnestness to life” (Stanley 42).  This letter demonstrates the emphasis that Dr. Arnold 
senior placed on work and on doing that work well, and his power as a public figure 
partook of a similar moral intensity and sense of possibility and responsibility.  With such 
high expectations and a duty that rests upon ideals come much self-reflection, self-
criticism, and, therefore, much doubt.  However, that uncertainty does not necessarily 
equal insincerity or untruth, and Dr. Arnold’s desire for and pursuit of perfection is what 
is most remarkable and prophetic and so evident in the workings of his son. 
  Matthew Arnold’s beliefs and opinions in relation to those of his father are the 
subject of much debate.  However, it is important to note, for my purposes, that Arnold 
senior clearly influenced Matthew’s social and political thought.  Although Matthew 
Arnold strongly disagreed with many of his father’s positions, indeed in some ways 
trying to “cultivate as great a divergence as possible from his father’s line” (Trilling 19), 
we can observe many similarities between these two men and their views.  Dr. Arnold 
had a significant influence on his son’s development as a critic, not least in showing how, 
starting from a disciplinary base—in his case history—one could and should move into a 
more public role, which brought with it a more expanded role for both faith and intellect.  
The father also helped seal his son’s life-long love for Oxford’s “dreaming spires”  
(“Thyrsis” 19) and lofty aspirations by ensuring he went up to Balliol College with what 
Arnold senior believed to be the right academic and religious preparation.  
Matthew Arnold matured in an age, the Victorian age, of tension and 
compromise, and of conflicts between science and religion.  The Church of England was 
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challenged by Evangelicalism and Tractarianism and also by science, and Arnold comes 
on the scene at a time when Anglicanism is less entrenched than it had been.  As Fraser 
states, “The theological basis of Anglicanism in the years before the advent of 
Tractarianism was extremely weak” (8).  What was needed was revitalization and some 
High Church thinkers and members of the Oxford Movement came to believe that 
Catholicism, with its aesthetic appeal and a focus on feeling and rituals, could bring about 
Anglicanism’s revitalization.  This attempt to couple poetry with faith, imagination with 
reason, is an attempt to add sensuality, and therefore appeal, to the Anglican faith.  The 
result was Ritualist controversy—a movement that overlaps with the later Oxford 
movement—which was a fight between extreme views of traditionalism and liberalism.  
The Ritualist appealed to the belief in the Sacrifice of Christ at the Eucharist, his real 
presence in the elements, and to the belief in Christ as an actual sacrifice on the altar.  
This perception’s stress was on the imagination, on the ability to have faith in Christ’s 
real presence  (Fraser 8-11).  Conversely, the Oxford Movement’s appeal was to the 
intellect, to reason, but later Tractarians realized that in order for the Church to produce 
moral change, to be successful in its revitalization, there had to be an appeal to 
imagination or faith in addition to an appeal to the intellect (DeLaura 57-59). The Oxford 
Movement, then, contained disagreement within itself amongst its members on how to 
accomplish this revitalization.  The two leaders of the original lines of antagonistic 
thought, the traditional and liberal attitudes, were John Henry Newman and Dr. Thomas 
Arnold.  Newman’s Tracts were “bent upon resisting ‘the assault of Liberalism upon the 
old orthodoxy of Oxford and England’, a Liberalism centered very strongly in the person 
of Thomas Arnold” (DeLaura 9).  Although both figures believed in the necessity of the 
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Church for producing moral change, they did not agree on the best method for bringing 
this about and thus became representative of two powerful factions within the Church of 
England.   
 Matthew Arnold was deeply influenced by these two opposing schools of thought.  
They played a large role in shaping his complicated religious position, and as DeLaura 
states, “he claimed both Oriel traditions as his own, though undoubtedly he was never 
willing or able to resolve the deep ambiguities of their union in his thinking” (9).  In 
Thomas Arnold, Matthew admired a lack of provinciality, or narrow-mindedness, which 
he felt most Oriel thinkers possessed (DeLaura 9).   For Matthew Arnold, this gave his 
father an objectivity, which he echoed in his insistence on criticism’s “disinterestedness,” 
although this term is also indebted to another role model of Arnold’s, Edmund Burke, 
who will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Two of this thesis.  In Newman, 
Matthew Arnold was fascinated by “that strange Newmanic power of words” (Ward 11) 
and Arnold’s fascination with Newman’s eloquence and charisma was a lasting one.  
Moreover, DeLaura discusses Arnold’s 1883 lecture on “Emerson”, found in Arnold’s 
Discourses in America, in which “Newman is presented as a figure of refined aesthetic 
interest in himself—a man of ‘imagination’, ‘genius’, ‘charm’, and ‘style’, a ‘spiritual 
apparition’” (DeLaura 15).  The dominant and crucial characteristics that Matthew 
Arnold develops and attributes to criticism and to the critic, or what we would call the 
public intellectual, can arguably be traced back to both Dr. Thomas Arnold and John 
Henry Newman. 
The political climate of the Victorian age is closely tied to its religious climate.  
The three main controversies, stemming from religious issues, are identified by Robbins 
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as: “biblical criticism, Ritualist practice, and the claims of physical science” (5).  Arnold 
is present here where public opinion and commentary engage with these large issues in 
the form of higher journalism, a phrase used by scholars like John Gross to designate 
intellectual exchange in the leading periodicals.  In The Rise and Fall of the Man of 
Letters, Gross insists that in the 1880s “the quality of the best Victorian journalism was 
exceptionally high, especially as far as the periodical press [was] concerned” (63).  There 
is both a hunger and a forum for public debate and, as Robbins indicates, “around 1870 
the amount of space given to all three [issues] by newspapers and periodicals, and the 
violence of the partisanship, suggest that there was still excitement for the general reader 
as well as a feeling of urgency in the devout and the informed” (Ethical Idealism 5).  The 
battle of the traditionalists and the liberals took place emphatically in print and, as Collini 
points out in his Introduction to Culture and Anarchy, much of it was in defense of or in 
response to a “central strain in Victorian political attitudes which insisted on the right of 
the individual to go about his business of ‘Doing as One Likes’” (Introduction xiv).  
Although Arnold called himself a Liberal (a term which is infinitely unfixed), as Collini 
points out Arnold usually qualified this self-characterization.  For example he is not a 
Liberal, but “‘a Liberal tempered by experience’ or, in a phrase he particularly favoured, 
‘a Liberal of the future’” (Introduction xxiv).  Arnold’s need to qualify his political 
stance signifies his disdain for smug or narrow pragmatism.  He desired social 
improvement, whereas this individualistic attitude indicated a society with low or no 
collective aspirations.  As Coulling suggests, Arnold’s mission was: 
to assist in the ‘intellectual deliverance’…and in the acquisition of ideas…;to 
exalt the ‘serious cheerfulness’ of Sophocles and the nobility of Homer as 
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examples of lucidity and grandeur for an age of vulgarity, and triviality of mind; 
to transform the middle class…;to show in the Hellenic ideal the basis for a 
culture that could solve the political and social problems of modern life; and to 
find for Christianity an intellectual basis supported by rather than vulnerable to 
the advances of science.  (20) 
Arnold uses culture as a means of engaging with the three main politico-religious 
controversies of the Victorian age, but also as uniting imagination and reason and thereby 
bringing about social improvement.  Coulling depicts Arnold’s desire to unite intellect 
with faith, a desire to inspire the middle class to seek understanding and inspiration in 
literature, and a desire to bring about positive social change by making a space for both 
Christianity and science.  Arnold does, however, begin with the idea of culture for, as 
Arnold says in a prescient letter to Clough in 1848, critics “must begin with an Idea of the 
world in order not to be prevailed over by the world’s multitudinousness” (Lang 128).  In 
an age where higher journalism flourishes, and at a time when a nourishing connection 
between literature and life is needed, Arnold is able to unite his vocation as poet with his 
sense of social duty.  His writings then, become increasingly political, controversial, and 
critical in order to fulfill his duty to society in its goal of a “growing and becoming” 
(C&A 62) in the “pursuit of perfection” (C&A 89).  
 Although appealing to the age and the climate in which Matthew Arnold lived 
cannot yield a complete and accurate understanding of him, both time and clime help 
account for his social criticism.  Arnold is a living contradiction in an age of 
accomplishment and vulnerability.  He is a political conservative, an intellectual and a 
religious aspirant.  Even in poetry, where Arnold begins, he is the embodiment of 
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contradiction, for when his friends and family discovered that he wrote poetry, they 
“were puzzled that a book [The Strayed Reveller] so gaily titled and by so gay a young 
man should be so sad” (Trilling 15).  But as most critics note, he gave up poetry, the 
realm of imagination and free play for cultural analysis.  It is important to note briefly 
Arnold’s attraction to Schiller’s aesthetic of free play and that Arnold redeploys it as 
critical disinterestedness in which there is an interplay of the permissive and prescriptive 
so as to separate wheat from chaff in order to create newly unified conditions for the 
exercise of future poetic freedom, which I will discuss in further detail later in this thesis.  
For Arnold the age was unpoetical “not because it [was] ugly but because it [was] 
without unity” (Trilling 24).  Indeed, in a letter to Clough Arnold complains about “how 
deeply unpoetical the age & all one’s surroundings are.  Not unprofound, not ungrand, 
not unmoving:--but unpoetical” (Lang 131).   The Victorian age was one in which 
political and religious issues “deeply, fiercely, and consistently…divided Victorian 
society” (C&A xviii) and the creative power could not adequately, or alone, deal with 
these issues.  Moreover, imagination had become dangerous for Arnold as poetic practice 
legitimized despair and hurt faith.  For example, in “Dover Beach” he indicates that 
poetry brings us to a debilitating consciousness of difficulties and doubts in one’s faith.  
Indeed, his speaker’s “Sea of Faith” (21) is disappearing as he hears only   
Its melancholy, long, withdrawing roar 
Retreating, to the breath 
Of the night- wind, down the vast edges drear 
And naked shingles of the world… 
                                                         (25-28) 
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Instead of a reasonable explanation for God’s silence, for example that God’s silence is 
the answer, the imagination encourages a dramatic and emotional response to an elusive 
or even unflattering divine presence.  As faith’s “roar” quickly becomes a barely audible 
“breath” we sense the poet’s bleak response.  Arnold’s contemplation of nature in this 
famous poem leads him inexorably from calm to agitation and bleak despair, a desperate 
appeal to romantic love as solace, and then to the apparently complete extinction of 
positive forces in the image of the night-battle.  The openness of imagination leads 
Arnold into an unconsoling view of life in which atheism and suicide seem like valid 
options, most notably perhaps in “Empedocles on Etna” which was omitted from his 
1853 edition of poems because “the disinterested objectivity [had] disappeared” (Preface 
1).  Although he deplored “too great a commitment to the critical intellect” (Trilling 24) 
when writing poetry, without the benefit of criticism’s bounty imagination preys on itself.  
In his analysis of the exclusion of  “Empedocles on Etna” in the Preface to his 1853 
collection of poems, Arnold’s fear of the imagination is apparent.  The poem signifies a 
time in the writer’s life in which “the dialogue of the mind with itself has commenced” 
(Preface 1).  This produces an acutely painful, challenging situation for the poet and the 
reader “in which the suffering finds no vent in action…in which there is everything to be 
endured and nothing to be done” (Preface 3).  The imagination that Arnold fears here is 
that which is no longer opposed to allegory.  For Arnold, when poetry becomes true by 
what it refers to philosophically, theologically, socially or culturally, it loses its authentic 
function and in turn becomes less true or real.  Poetry is important because it can be an 
example of the imagination at its best and it provides the optimistic outlook on life that 
Arnold is looking for.  As Arnold later explains in “The Study of Poetry” (1888), “in 
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poetry, where it is worthy of its high destinies, our race, as time goes on, will find an ever 
surer and surer stay…Poetry attaches its emotion to the idea; the idea is the fact” (Essays 
in Criticism 2, 1-2).   Despite the stress Arnold places on the imagination, as the critic in 
whom “the dialogue of the mind with itself has commenced” (Preface 1), Arnold is 
compelled to leave poetry because he has lost this sublime sense of the imagination 
thereby rendering his poetry “poetically faulty” (Preface 3).  Therefore, around 1857 
when Arnold’s Muse had disappeared (Trilling 158) he renounces imagination and turns 
to criticism as a justification of his real fear of his own imagination.   
 This turn to criticism is also a turn away from the anti-intellectualism of Victorian 
society and the realization that “the present age must be coped with” (Trilling 31).  There 
is a sense of intellectual deficiency in Victorian society (note Arnold’s use of terms such 
as ‘Philistine’ which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2 and Arnold’s frustrations 
with this deficiency).  His frustration is also personal and the turn to criticism is a 
necessity, a drama, a struggle for his soul.  There is a sense that he has to make this work 
in terms of social improvement as well as personal contentment.  In order for criticism to 
work for the public as well as the private good, it must be understood and practiced as 
serious, historically necessary, and intelligible in its relationship to creativity.  Therefore 
Arnold aligns himself with people like Goethe, “Europe’s sagest head” (“Memorial 
Verses” 148), who recognize the shift into prose as a process, not an abandonment so 
much as a re-empowering of poetry.  Trilling points to Goethe who said that “what is 
really deeply and fundamentally effective—what is truly educative and inspiring, is what 
remains of the poet when he is translated into prose” (Trilling 31).  Certainly I am not 
implying that what Arnold does as a critic can appropriately or only be seen as 
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“translation” rather I would argue that Goethe is suggesting that it is inspiring to see what 
is left of the poet and his or her dedication to truth and beauty, when he or she works in 
prose.  That is, if Arnold believed that poetry should illuminate the human condition by 
offering a satisfying sense of reality and reconciling human beings with the universe 
(“Maurice de Guérin” 111) one might ask if these aspirations are apparent in his prose as 
well.  Although Arnold’s turn to criticism is, in part, a response to the intellectual 
deficiency in Victorian society he also recognized that as a poet he was too apt to be 
overcome by the world’s multitudinousness.  That is, Arnold attributed Victorian 
intellectual deficiency to disunity, which was because poets (in this instance he is 
speaking particularly of Keats and Browning) do not “understand that they must begin 
with an Idea of the world in order not to be prevailed over by the world’s 
multitudinousness: or if they cannot get that, at least with isolated ideas: & all other 
things shall (perhaps) be added unto them” (Letters 129).  However, Arnold’s criticism 
maintains and advances poetry’s greatest attribute, the grand style, which adds to one’s 
thoughts and feelings, and elevates one’s mind.  And what is connected to the idea of the 
grand style which “is the expression of the nobility of the poet’s character” (Letters 133), 
is the idea of conduct, which easily moves to the idea of the figure, the critic, the public 
intellectual.       
 Arnold supports criticism when it is authoritative and socially influential.  It is 
important to note that higher journalism at this time is very influential with the middle 
class and is meeting a need that religion either seems unable to meet or prevents people 
from meeting.  Faith was based on fact, and in an age of increased science and intellect, 
fact failed taking faith with it.  In the opening of “The Study of Poetry” Arnold says that 
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“Our religion has materialised itself in the fact, in the supposed fact; it has attached its 
emotion to the fact, and now the fact is failing it” (Essays in Criticism 2, 1-2).  After he 
turns away from poetry, Arnold creates a path for himself and in order to be authoritative, 
because authority brings responsibility, he looks for role models in addition to his father 
and finds one in Edmund Burke.  In doing so, he challenges his rearing which was “in the 
tradition of men who felt themselves mortal vessels of truth” (Trilling 18).  Despite the 
challenge to his father’s tradition, Arnold shares the same sense of duty to society as his 
father and develops throughout his works what he calls culture, and creates for himself a 
public to which he can communicate the best ideas and promote the pursuit of perfection. 
 Arnold, as a man who is influenced by those who came before him and yet 
maintains a distinctive individuality, appeals to the reader, to society, to his public: 
But for us,—who believe in right reason, in the duty and possibility of extricating 
and elevating our best self, in the progress of humanity towards perfection,—for 
us the framework of society, that theatre on which this august drama has to unroll 
itself, is sacred; and whoever administers it, and however we may seek to remove 
them from their tenure of administration, yet, while they administer, we steadily 
and with undivided heart support them in repressing anarchy and disorder; 
because without order there can be no society, and without society there can be no 
human perfection.  (C&A 191)     
Arnold is not only a part of the “us” that is involved here; he is also a part of the group 
that “administers” the “right reason” out of a sense of “duty.”  The tension here is 
between cultural ambition and political conservatism.  Society unfolds towards perfection 
within the containing frames of properly constituted political authority and the classical 
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(“august”) ordering of dramatic action.  Arnold expands the realm of the “sacred” to 
include social order as a pre-requisite for the renewal of Christian faith through culture to 
which he aspires.  Reforming zeal is constrained by civic duty and Arnold calls for 
support in his purpose for both public and private reasons, and, therefore, his stress on the 
importance of criticism and culture leads to the figure of the public intellectual. 
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Chapter One: Prescribing Criticism 
  
 “The Function of Criticism at the Present Time,” a lecture delivered in Oxford in 
October 1864, published in the National Review later the same year and then reprinted in 
Essays in Criticism (1865), offers a good avenue into Arnold’s thinking.  In this long and 
important essay we find Arnold’s prescription for what criticism is and ought to do in 
mid-Victorian Britain.  At the time that “The Function of Criticism” was published 
Arnold still held the Professorship of Poetry at Oxford.  He was exercising the authority 
of critical judgement in both his academic position at Oxford and in his writing, as is seen 
in The National Review (November 1864), the periodical in which “The Function of 
Criticism” first appeared.  And we, a specifically university educated public, must note 
here that Arnold insists on an informed type of criticism.  In the opening of “The 
Function of Criticism” he equates the critic and the man of letters, and insists that they 
are not merely uninformed admirers, but evince much more than a simple affection for 
the topic or the author; they possess both admiration and expertise.  Moreover, we must 
consider Arnold’s intended audience, which becomes clearer when we consider the 
linguistic cosmopolitanism of the essay, with citations in French and German as well as 
Virgil’s Latin, and when we note the allusions that go beyond disciplinary parochialism 
and the narrowly literary.  He speaks primarily to fellow intellectuals and a cultivated 
public.  We now have a sense of the authority Arnold wants to give to the critic.   
However, with authority comes responsibility and Arnold was exercising the 
authority of critical judgement, of criticism, of culture, because of his sense of public 
responsibility in his academic position as well as his literary one.  He was concerned 
about society’s growing provinciality and was interested in the institutions that could 
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combat it.  In the “Literary Influence of Academies,” an essay which first appeared in the 
Cornhill Magazine in August 1866, he argues that although the English did have “energy 
and honesty” (“Literary Influence” 49) they did not have “an open and clear mind, not a 
quick and flexible intelligence” (“Literary Influence” 49).  And as Coulling suggests “the 
faults from which [English] literature suffered were therefore precisely those that are 
prevented by an intellectual center and authority such as academies afford” (140).  
Although Arnold’s dislike of provinciality is apparent in the “Literary Influence of 
Academies,” his attack on Philistinism and the characteristics that accompany this title 
are explored more fully in “ The Function of Criticism at the Present Time.” 
In order to elucidate criticism and to explain its importance I will discuss 
functions such as seeing the object “as in itself it really is” (“Function” 29), creating the 
“intellectual situation of which the creative power can profitably avail itself” (29) so that 
“the best ideas prevail (29), exercising “the free play of the mind” (“Function” 35), 
knowing “the best that is thought and known in the world” (“Function” 37), evincing and 
promoting “disinterestedness” (37), and engaging with “ever fresh knowledge” 
(“Function” 49).  These cognitive and educative functions can be captured in three 
broader claims: for the importance of critical perception, for the necessity of criticism as 
a historically useful activity enabling the next phase of human development, and for the 
exemplary and transformative force of critical judgement in improving ethical and 
political as well as cultural standards.  The claims advanced by  “The Function of 
Criticism at the Present Time,” foreshadow much of what follows in a more fully 
elaborated, socially situated, and theologically connected form in Culture and Anarchy 
and Literature and Dogma. 
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Arnold stresses the importance not only of criticism in general, but also of 
detailed critical perception.  Criticism’s chief objective is truth or seeing the object “as in 
itself it really is” (“Function” 29), a formula which is itself rhetorical in its double 
assurance of accuracy and truth, and it is here that critical power and critical perception 
are so important.  As Arnold points out, the creative power may employ “appointed 
elements” (29) or avail itself of the “best ideas” (“Function” 28), but it does not have 
them under its control.  Rather, the creative power utilizes ideas “within the control of the 
critical power” (“Function” 29).  Moreover, “it is the business of the critical power…to 
see the object as in itself it really is” (29).  For Arnold truth itself is relative; it is 
something that escapes us almost as soon as it has been “perceived.”  It is only a critical 
power that allows one to see the object, and to arrive at a critical perception of the object 
“as in itself it really is” (29).  Only the critical power creates “an intellectual situation of 
which the creative power can profitably avail itself” (29) and this interdependency 
between the creative and the critical produces Arnold’s version of culture.   
The move Arnold makes is toward a regeneration of poetry and literature, and he 
argues that exercising the creative power without the critical power produces literary 
creations that are short-lived.  Arnold explains the imperfections of literature that were 
produced by the Romantics or those who “did not know enough” (“Function” 30).   
It has long seemed to me that the burst of creative activity in our literature, 
through the first quarter of this century, had about it in fact something premature; 
and that from this cause its productions are doomed, most of them, in spite of the 
sanguine hopes which accompanied and do still accompany them, to prove hardly 
more lasting than the productions of far less splendid epochs.  And this 
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prematureness comes from its having proceeded without having its proper data, 
without sufficient materials to work with.  (30-31) 
Arnold looks forward here to Harold Bloom’s Oedipal reading of the Romantics by the 
Victorians in The Anxiety of Influence.  Bloom argues that the Romantics (and modern 
poets for that matter) are doomed to create impoverished and diminished poetic works 
that are inevitably secondary to the works of their strong precursors, starting with Milton.  
They are aware of this influence and in turn feel the anxiety of trying to escape their 
“fathers’” influence by creative patricide.  Moreover, there appears to be a discreet appeal 
to procreation in Arnold’s prose and to the unproductive overeagerness of premature 
ejaculation, an appeal to heterosexual masculinity, the fear of sexual inferiority, and the 
embarrassment one might feel in producing “premature productions” that are neither 
“lasting” nor “splendid.”  Writers that are not nourished by a critical effort—Arnold 
presumes that the public he is writing to is exclusively male, although the double 
entendres might not be lost on a female audience either—are rendered impotent (or at 
least unfulfilling) due to this lack of knowledge, and they cannot create “grand works” 
unless they know more.  Although he does not deny the genius of Byron (a strong sexual 
signifier) he does use Byron as an example of the poet whose work is not “worth much” 
(“Function” 29), who is neither great nor modern for his lack of “critical effort behind 
[his genius]” (29).  Instead, Arnold projects himself into Goethe and praises the German 
poet’s work which “was nourished by great critical effort” (29) and was therefore 
enduring and the “best.”  The stress here, then, is not only on knowing more, but on 
knowing more subjects “as they really are” (29), which one can only do, Arnold argues, 
when “a great critical effort” (29) underpins genius and creativity.  There is more than an 
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implied balance of the creative and the critical and its gradual move to societal 
improvement, and it is important to note Arnold’s aesthetic ideology and that it is 
mapped onto his poetic engagement with Wordsworth, Byron and Goethe.  His insistence 
on Goethe’s critical effort, on code, order, and discipline nourished by the creativity of 
Wordsworth and Byron—on  a balance of the creative and the critical—is important to 
Arnold as both criticism and creativity are properties not only of a good poem, but also of 
a good society.   
Following Arnold’s stress on the importance of critical perception in the personal 
sphere, Arnold then emphasizes the importance of critical perception by applying it to the 
social and more political spheres.  Critical perception is particularly important to a 
functioning social and political sphere as it is the source of harmony between the realm of 
ideas and the realm of practice.  To demonstrate these terms’ interdependency, before he 
reasserts the necessity of critical perception, he illuminates and complicates this 
relationship and in turn shows the “anarchy” of extremes.  In discussing the French 
Revolution and its “grand error” (“Function” 33) he points his finger at its reckless, 
premature movement towards the practical.  He believes in the importance of ideas in and 
of themselves, apart from their practical use, aims and application.  For example he says,  
the French Revolution, and its movement of ideas, by quitting the intellectual 
sphere and rushing furiously into the political sphere, ran, indeed, a prodigious 
and memorable course, but produced no such intellectual fruit as the movement of 
ideas of the Renascence, and created, in opposition to itself, what I may call an 
epoch of concentration.  (33 emphasis his)    
 19
Arnold draws a distinction between the French Revolution, with its “political, practical 
character” (“Function” 31) and its failed harvest of literary works, and “the great 
productive time of Greece or…the Renascence…[which were] disinterestedly intellectual 
and spiritual movements; movements in which the human spirit looked for its satisfaction 
in itself and in the increased play of its own activity” (31) and which produced the 
abundance of works that the period of the French Revolution lacked.  As Findlay aptly 
indicates, for the French Revolution “[t]he ‘movement of ideas’ becomes too invasive 
and transgressive, and points to the dependence of ideas for success upon an appropriate 
sphere of operation.  Otherwise, the turn outward of ideas from themselves creates 
resistance and the conditions of self-defeat” (6).  In other words, ideas may be mobile yet 
restricted and incomplete.  Arnold makes an implication concerning the impracticability 
and sterility of the uncultivated crop and the dangers of excessive reason paired with 
moderate ideas, which produces only “blind love [of practicality] and…blind hatred [of 
ideas]” (“Function” 31).  Here we can note the severity of the language and the irony of 
enlightenment reason producing blind allegiances and aversions.  Indeed, the result of 
excessive practicality or reason is the inability to “see” or to see the object as in itself it 
really is.     
Arnold’s example of excessive practicality is the Englishman.  He says that the 
Englishman   
is like the Lord Auckland of Burke’s day, who, in a memorandum on the  French 
Revolution, talks of ‘certain miscreants assuming the name of philosophers, who 
have presumed themselves capable of establishing a new system of society’.  The 
Englishman has been called a political animal, and he values what is political and 
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practical so much that ideas easily become objects of dislike in his eyes, and 
thinkers ‘miscreants’, because ideas and thinkers have rashly meddled with 
politics and practice.  (“Function” 35)        
Arnold is careful to point out that this hatred is unreasonable hatred of ideas in general 
not just the ideas which meddle with practice, but also those that are connected to “the 
whole life of intelligence” (35).  This sardonic rebuttal of bluff anti-intellectualism 
follows a well-rounded commendation of his role model, Edmund Burke, whose writing, 
during the French Revolution’s “grand error” (“Function” 33), Arnold distinguished as 
having a “philosophical truth” (“Function” 34).  By contrasting Burke’s authoritative 
philosophical truth with the Englishman’s scorn of those “miscreants” who assume the 
name “philosopher,” Arnold discredits the Englishman and reveals another side to his 
“animal” behaviours.  The ultra-pragmatic Englishman lacks precisely the crucial critical 
perception to see the good in ideas and is much too eager to dismiss foreign ideas and 
their English supporters as rash and impractical.           
Although Arnold insists on the importance of ideas, independent from party 
politics, he reins them in so as to avoid excess.  Arnold’s conservatism shows through 
when he states that although “[i]deas cannot be too much prized in and for themselves” 
(“Function” 32) there is a sort of  “mania [in] giving an immediate political and practical 
application to [them]” (32).  The mania that Arnold speaks of here, the excess of ideas, 
has an Empedoclean quality to it.  That is, ideas should not be too much prized in and for 
themselves because this leads to “the dialogue of the mind with itself” (Preface 1) and 
can only be seen as an unproductive Empedoclean inwardness.  There needs to be, then, a 
balance between ideas and practice and this balance is achieved by the critical perception.  
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This perception can be attained by insisting on a habitual “return upon [the self]” 
(“Function” 35).  For example, Arnold discusses Burke’s greatness in that “he brings 
thought to bear upon politics; he saturates politics with thought” (“Function” 34).  What 
is even more impressive, for Arnold, is Burke’s ability not only to maintain this critical 
perception and his independence from “the world of catchwords and party habits” (34), 
but still to “be irresistibly carried…by the current of thought to the opposite side of the 
question” (“Function” 35) even “when one side of a question has long had [his] earnest 
support and [engaged feelings]” (35).  Burke, according to Arnold, has this critical 
perception which is so important in creating the intellectual situation of which the 
creative power can profitably avail itself so that the best ideas prevail.  Arnold argues for 
the necessity of criticism or the critical perception, which helps to avoid the extremes of 
ideas, reason or “anarchy.”  Moreover he insists on a responsible relationship between 
reason and ideas, the creative and the critical, thus insisting on the importance of the 
critical perception.  
Arnold’s next broad claim argues for the necessity of criticism as a historically 
useful activity in preparing for the next phase of human development.  This claim is fully 
realized by “[t]he notion of the free play of the mind” (35) and knowing “the best that is 
known and thought in the world” (“Function” 36).  Arnold makes the move from arguing 
for a more practical use of criticism, that is, identifying its function, to reminding the 
reader that we must avoid extremes.  As he optimistically notes, “epochs of concentration 
cannot well endure for ever; epochs of expansion, in the due course of things, follow 
them” (36).  Arnold persuades his reader by both conceding society’s desire for material 
progress and by challenging society to move past it: 
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Then, too, in spite of all that is said about the absorbing and brutalising influence 
of our passionate material progress, it seems to me indisputable that this progress 
is likely, though not certain, to lead in the end to an apparition, of intellectual life; 
and that man, after he has made himself perfectly comfortable and has now to 
determine what to do with himself next, may begin to remember that he has a 
mind, and that the mind may be made the source of great pleasure.  (36) 
Arnold acknowledges a general idea of progress, only to refute it.  Progress here is only 
material progress, and there is the inference of a painful absence of spiritual and 
intellectual progress of which Arnold is only too aware.  This passage forms a firm 
ground for Arnold’s argument towards progress in Culture and Anarchy, only his is “the 
progress of humanity towards perfection” (C&A 181).  He challenges the reader not only 
to use one’s mind, but to use it and to find great pleasure.  In this challenge we see 
Arnold’s deep concerned commitment to the values of his own class and his distaste for 
society’s practicality, provinciality and unhealthy preoccupation with the pursuit of 
material progress.   
He makes an appeal to creativity here, which is necessarily preceded by an appeal 
to criticism as criticism is “the instrument for [the] discovery and evaluation” of ideas 
(Trilling 192), in order to promote “curiosity” (“Function” 35).  Curiosity here, is a love 
of a free play—with its prescriptive as well as permissive duty and its appeal to 
pleasure—of the mind on all things, all subjects (35) and will, Arnold hopes, lead to an 
epoch of expansion of thought and of ideas.  It is impossible here not to recall that in the 
Preface of 1853 Arnold aptly quotes Schiller who says that “‘All art…is dedicated to Joy, 
and there is no higher and serious problem, than how to make men happy.  The right art is 
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that alone, which creates the highest enjoyment’” (Preface 2).  In Arnold’s appeal to 
creativity there is that tension, so common in his writing, between freedom and the 
conservative intellectual civics of an order of ideas.  Despite putting the critical power at 
lower rank than the creative (“Function” 28), Arnold insists that “grand works of literary 
genius” (28) can only be inspired “by a certain order of ideas” (28).  Indeed there are 
ideas, and there is order, and Arnold feels that this tension is necessary to his idea of 
culture.  By exercising a Schillerian free play of the mind, Arnold redefines the object of 
criticism as seeking to “know the best that is known and thought in the world” 
(“Function” 36), and to know this with the aim of creating “a current of true and fresh 
ideas” (“Function” 37).  Here, Arnold insists that criticism must create this abundance of 
“true and fresh ideas” (37) with an “inflexible honesty” (37) and, more importantly, it 
must do so while “leav[ing] alone all questions of practical consequences and 
applications” (37).  He insists on this point because a preoccupation with practical 
consequences stifles criticism.  By remaining, for a time, in the purely intellectual sphere, 
criticism avoids a certain self-centredness.  That is, it is free of specific interests, and this 
“disinterestedness,” which is developed more fully in the next section, becomes the mark 
of the critic as well as the poet, and therefore also of the healthy society.  Criticism, then, 
creates the atmosphere for creativity, for an abundance of new ideas, and prepares 
humanity for its next phase of development. 
Arnold’s final claim argues for the exemplary and transformative force of critical 
judgement in improving standards (ethical and political as well as cultural).  Here, Arnold 
evinces and promotes “disinterestedness” (37) and encourages an engagement with 
“every fresh knowledge” (“Function” 49).  In order to claim criticism, or the critic, as that 
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exemplary and transformative force, we must first examine Arnold’s definition of 
criticism, or the role of the critic.  Arnold says that criticism should be disinterested and 
that a proper critic is one who is “aloof from what is called ‘the practical view of things’” 
(“Function” 37).  As Collini points out, the word “disinterested” has suffered from its 
share of misunderstanding (Arnold 56).  Perhaps, as Collini explains, Arnold’s treatment 
of disinterestedness is one that collaborates in its own misinterpretation. 
And how is criticism to show disinterestedness?  By keeping aloof from what is 
called ‘the practical view of things’; by resolutely following the law of its own 
nature, which is to be a free play of the mind on all subjects which it touches.  By 
steadily refusing to lend itself to any of those ulterior, political, practical 
considerations about ideas, which plenty of people will be sure to attach to them, 
which perhaps ought often to be attached to them, which in this country at any 
rate are certain to be attached to them, quite insufficiently, but which criticism has 
really nothing to do with. (“Function” 37) 
The style and substance of this passage are “disinterested” as we can note the interplay of 
activity and inactivity, engagement and detachment, fatalism and aspiration, the certain 
and the heavily qualified.  Collini rightly asserts that disinterested does not mean 
uninterested; rather, it means a belief in the work of criticism as a process.  For example, 
Arnold is quick to make a point about the lack of  (in England) a journal like the Revue 
des Deux Mondes which has “for its main function to understand and utter the best that is 
known and thought in the world” (“Function” 37).  Arnold is also careful to show that he 
reads a wide range of English newspapers and periodicals such as the Edinburgh Review, 
the Quarterly Review, the British Quarterly Review, and the Times in order to 
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demonstrate that he is journalistically plugged in, as any public intellectual needs to be.  
The point is to remain unattached to, not uninterested in a specific social or political 
climate or issue.  The purpose for Arnold, however, is to also create a climate of 
creativity and this cannot be accomplished if there “is any attempt to subordinate 
criticism to some other purpose” (Arnold 56).  As Findlay states, “Arnold specifies 
several grounds of critical disinterestedness: the aesthetic idealism of Kant and Schiller 
(and their converts to ‘free play’); the objective journalism of the Revue des Deux 
Mondes; the East Indian ‘virtue of detachment’…; and the aesthetic quietism of 
Obermann….” (9).  Here, the attack against provincialism is linked to a literary public 
sphere and figures such as Sainte-Beuve as public intellectual whose influence “was 
mainly in the field of literary criticism, a matter of ‘method’…His tact, his humanistic 
standard, the objectivity and curiosité…above all, the balance struck with unerring 
precision—these were what Arnold admired and tried to emulate” (Robbins Arnoldian 
56, emphasis his).   For Arnold, criticism must maintain its independence from partisan 
interests while finding itself a public. 
To prepare the reader to accept criticism’s disinterestedness and in order to 
establish authority for this often confusing term, Arnold evokes Burke as a figure who is 
able to practice disinterestedness before partisanship, or to make a “return upon himself” 
(“Function” 35).  Arnold quotes the conclusion to Burke’s “Thoughts on French Affairs” 
and then comments as follows: 
That return of Burke upon himself has always seemed to me one of the finest 
things in English literature, or indeed in any literature.  That is what I call living 
by ideas: when one side of a question has long had your earnest support, when all 
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your feelings are engaged, when you hear all around you no language but one, 
when your party talks this language like a steam-engine and can imagine no other, 
—still to be able to think, still to be irresistibly carried, if so it be, by the current 
of thought to the opposite side of the question, and like Balaam, to be unable to 
speak anything but what the Lord has put in your mouth.  I know nothing more 
striking, and I must add that I know nothing more un-English.  (“Function” 35)   
The duty of criticism—which is also the duty of the critic—is to know the best 
“irrespective of practice, politics, and everything of the kind” (“Function” 36).  Arnold 
pinpoints this disinterestedness as an exemplary kind of “instinct” which he assigns to 
Balaam, an “unlikely but compelling visionary” (Findlay 8).  Balaam, like Burke, 
remained committed to an inward state (which in his case allowed him to discern the 
words of the Holy Spirit) or the world of ideas, free from outward concerns and “the 
world of catchwords and party habits” (“Function” 34).  Disinterestedness is also 
described by Robbins as “intellectual flexibility…[which is] the virtue of the true 
critic…[and which avoids] total commitment of a rigid or fanatical kind” (Arnoldian 75).  
This commitment, this return upon oneself, this disinterestedness, enables both Burke and 
Balaam to assume an objectivity which Arnold greatly admires and which establishes 
them as responsible critics of society.      
It is only when criticism is disinterested, independent from interests of any party 
or group, that true and fresh ideas can be created.  He begins this stage of his argument by 
addressing the charge of criticism’s “ill” accomplishment (“Function” 38) and explains 
the reasons why this is the case. 
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It is because criticism has so little kept in the pure intellectual sphere, has so little 
detached itself from practice, has been so directly polemical and controversial, 
that it has so ill accomplished, in this country, its best spiritual work; which is to 
keep man from a self-satisfaction which is retarding and vulgarizing, to lead him 
towards perfection, by making his mind dwell upon what is excellent in itself and 
the absolute fitness of things. (38) 
For Arnold, this is not criticism in the true sense.  It has a desired practical goal, and it 
leads to dangerous self-satisfaction, which inspires neither growth nor transformation.  
There is a gross misconception of an achieved, absolute perfection, which Arnold would 
argue does exist, but cannot and should not be reached.  He criticises Adderley and 
Roebuck who express this self-satisfaction and the uncritical tone in which they praise 
the old Anglo-Saxon race (“Function” 38).  Contrary to Burke, who returned upon 
himself in order to recognize the danger of too close an affiliation with a certain group or 
claim, Adderley and Roebuck not only express their liking for a specific action, but they 
extend this sentiment and claim the superiority of their race over all others.  As Collini 
states, what Arnold wanted was “to try to open up English consciousness to European 
ideas and perspectives, and to provoke his readers into an uneasy awareness of the 
limitations of their established mental habits” (Arnold 9).  What Adderley and Roebuck 
are essentially doing is exaggerating, and Arnold has little patience with this.  Any 
exaggeration regarding one’s superiority automatically leads to a type of complacency 
and inhibits a move towards any type of exemplary transformation; and certainly 
England’s middle-class was exerting a self-confidence that Arnold detested.  As Collini 
so aptly puts it, Arnold’s argument “was not a matter of forcing the reader to abandon 
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one position in favour of another, but of putting him in the way of the experience which, 
when reflected upon, would bring home to him the defects of the frame of mind that had 
found expression in the erroneous ‘position’ in the first place” (Arnold 9).    
 Arnold goes from discussing what criticism should not do, to what it ought to do.  
If critical judgement, or criticism, is going to be an exemplary and transformative force in 
improving ethical, political, as well as cultural standards then there must be some 
persuasive element to it.  He is not talking about deception, where one gives a grand 
name to something that is not a grand thing.  Arnold is, however, setting up his criticism 
against the criticism that repeatedly offends against openness and accuracy.  He explains 
this persuasive element as an attitude—although he develops it further in Culture and 
Anarchy as the “grand style”—and “insist[s] on the attitude which criticism should adopt 
towards things in general” (“Function” 49).  One of the things, or attitudes that criticism 
should adopt, according to Arnold, is of course “the idea of a disinterested endeavour to 
propagate the best that is known and thought in the world, and thus to establish a current 
of true and fresh ideas” (49).  What criticism must do then, is to engage with fresh 
knowledge.  One source of such knowledge is foreign thought.  Arnold stresses this point, 
of criticism’s duty to dwell on foreign thought, because he recognizes, or at least claims 
to, that England is not the rest of the world (49) and that not all that is the best originates 
in England.  Therefore, the critic must become acquainted with what is considered 
foreign.  This leads Arnold to his final claim, that  
[k]nowledge, and ever fresh knowledge, must be the critic’s great concern for 
himself.  And it is by communicating fresh knowledge, and letting his own 
judgement pass along with it, —but insensibly, and in the second place, not the 
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first, as a sort of companion and clue, not as an abstract law-giver, —that the 
critic will generally do most good to his readers.  (49) 
This passage is notable for its optimistic and hopeful tone, and we feel his shift from 
criticism’s duty to the critic’s duty.  Arnold is not only creating a place for criticism, but 
he is writing what Robbins calls “a manifesto of method and principle [and how this is 
an] important function of the critic” (Ethical Idealism 160).  The reader also senses a sort 
of prophet-like quality ascribed to the critic and his or her duty, which is a response to a 
society (and to Matthew Arnold) who is in need of “an intellectual deliverance from 
spiritual distress” (Carroll 38) and which prepares us for what comes in Culture and 
Anarchy and Literature and Dogma.  There is also a desire to do good, and in some ways 
Arnold is creating a public to receive his work, which he feels may act as the exemplary 
and transformative force that will save society and himself.   
 Arnold’s understanding of the notion of criticism in “The Function of Criticism” 
is also already connected to biblical criticism and will never shake off that influence.  
Indeed his criticism has an authority which gauges the “correctness” or “incorrectness” of 
all other literary works, religious or otherwise.  He says, “It is really the strongest 
possible proof of the low ebb at which, in England, the critical spirit is, that while the 
critical hit in the religious literature of Germany is Dr. Strauss’s book, in that of France 
M. Renan’s book, the book of Bishop Colenso is the critical hit in the religious literature 
of England” (“Function” 45).  Arnold makes reference to the Colenso controversy (1862) 
in which he responds to Colenso’s published biblical inquiries.  “The Bishop and the 
Philosopher” appeared in the January issue of Macmillan’s Magazine, and, as Coulling 
suggests, it is here Arnold first claims “for literary criticism a wider province and a 
 30
greater authority than he had previously claimed” (106).  And as Arnold attempts to carve 
out a space for literary criticism, as he is repeatedly drawn into the Colenso controversy, 
and as it finds its way into “The Function of Criticism,” it is beginning to be clear that the 
connection between Arnold’s criticism and biblical criticism will be a lasting one.  I 
would argue that each of Arnold’s claims made here contribute to Arnold’s modelling of 
the public intellectual.  The “functions” of criticism become the functions of the critic as 
these functions take on the quality of characteristics and duties.  That is to say, Arnold 
discusses what criticism should be and what criticism should do, but in doing so he 
creates a role for himself as critic, which foreshadows much of what is to come in both 
Culture and Anarchy and Literature and Dogma.  Moreover, Arnold’s function of 
criticism becomes a model for the function of the critic as a figure embodying a harmony 
of reason and imagination and promoting both.  What evolves in “The Function of 
Criticism at the Present Time” is a move from acquiring fresh knowledge or the 
importance of fresh knowledge itself to communicating fresh knowledge.  Towards the 
end of the essay there is more stress on the social role of criticism and, as DeLaura 
indicates, “[b]y the time of Culture and Anarchy the ‘social’ motive had changed the 
entire ethical complexion of Arnold's ideal” (228).  We will explore these implications 
and their influence on Arnold’s modelling of the critic or what we would call the public 
intellectual. 
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Chapter Two: Culture’s Social Mission 
 
Sidney Coulling states that Culture and Anarchy “is properly read not as a 
definitive essay in political and social criticism but as a part of a continuing controversy 
in which Arnold engaged for well over a decade” (210).  The controversy began in 1867 
when Frederic Harrison, “a determined positivist” (Coulling 182) made a direct challenge 
to Arnold’s idea of culture.  In the Fortnightly Review Harrison replied very 
disapprovingly to Robert Lowe’s thesis that praised the man of culture and in doing so 
Harrison was directly challenging the thesis of “The Function of Criticism at the Present 
Time,” in which “the concept of culture had been adumbrated” (Coulling 183).  Harrison 
countered Arnold’s culture on its most important points.  That is, Harrison essentially 
denied culture’s role as the proliferator of “the best that is known and thought in the 
world” (C&A 36) he equated Arnold’s disinterestedness with indecision, and he ridiculed 
Arnold’s “free play of the mind” (C&A 35) by favouring and insisting upon practical 
solutions to practical problems (Coulling 183).   
Arnold, of course, found Harrison and his claims hugely objectionable, and his 
lecture delivered at Oxford on June 7, 1867, responded  to Harrison’s arguments.  This 
lecture was in part the essay on “Culture and Its Enemies” which was eventually 
published in The Cornhill Magazine and which was the first in a series of essays that 
were to make up Culture and Anarchy.  Arnold’s essay sparked heated debate in several 
periodicals with responses ranging from angry name-calling to enthusiastic support.  
Some of Arnold’s biggest antagonists were publications like the Illustrated Times, the 
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Nonconformist, and the Mercury, which were populist and anti-Anglican in their stances, 
and two of his few supporters were the Globe and Traveller and the intellectually 
powerful and progressive Westminster Review.  The articles, whether enthusiastic 
endorsements, intelligent responses, or open protestations, were all useful to Arnold’s 
next essay, which Coulling says (and Arnold’s Letters confirm) had been underway since 
early summer (192).  “Anarchy and Authority” was supposed to be a single essay, but 
quickly turned into five essays as “the early numbers of the ‘Anarchy and Authority’ 
series were in turn attacked by the periodical press and thus called for further sequels” 
(192).  The criticisms were particularly important as Arnold felt the need to address the 
four main objections in “Anarchy and Authority” while simultaneously feeling the 
frustrations of trying to impress a public that he was trying to create.  It is important to 
note here that, as Arnold is trying to create a public for himself, he is realizing that the 
critic, or what we might call the public intellectual, can only impress part of the public 
and must therefore choose a particular tone and strategy of admonition and appeal.  
“Culture and Its Enemies” and “Anarchy and Authority” became Culture and Anarchy: 
An Essay in Political and Social Criticism and evolved out of a dialogue in print, which 
was both sensitive to and critical of public opinion.        
Culture and Anarchy: An Essay in Political and Social Criticism is an example of 
what has already been mapped in “The Function of Criticism at the Present Time.”  In 
Culture and Anarchy the functions of criticism fall under one large category, culture, 
which has “its origin in the love of perfection; it is the study of perfection” (59; emphasis 
his).  Criticism is further empowered in this famous work, and in Culture and Anarchy 
we see the marriage of the creative and the critical that had been increasingly at odds in 
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Arnold’s own practice as poet and essayist.  Culture mediates between the critical or 
creative self and society, reconciling interests with disinterestedness.  This Chapter will 
expand and explain how the “functions” of criticism are developed within Arnold’s 
“culture” and will connect those claims made in “The Function of Criticism at the Present 
Time” to those developed in Culture and Anarchy.  As DeLaura plainly puts it, “‘The 
Function of Criticism’ had anticipated Culture and Anarchy…[and] ‘[c]riticism’ and 
‘culture’ are overlapping and chronologically continuous terms; the latter absorbs the 
former…and adds to it an ideal of man’s total—moral and intellectual—perfection” (70).  
The three claims, then, developed in “The Function of Criticism,” namely the importance 
of critical perception, the necessity of criticism as a historically useful activity in 
preparing for the next phase of human development, and the exemplary and 
transformative force of critical judgement in improving standards (ethical, political, as 
well as cultural), are more fully developed in Culture and Anarchy.    Arnold defines 
culture as “a study of perfection [which] moves by the force, not merely or primarily of 
the scientific passion for pure knowledge, but also of the moral and social passion for 
doing good” (C&A 59).  This definition is a variation on the rational/ethical, 
theoretical/practical doublet so common in Arnold’s work.  Arnold, the good 
cosmopolitan, also borrows mottos from Montesquieu who says that culture renders “‘an 
intelligent being yet more intelligent’” (C&A 59-60) as well as from Bishop Wilson who 
says that it is “‘[t]o make reason and the will of God prevail’” (C&A 60).  Arnold derives 
the provenance of culture from the Greeks, despite their “lack of moral fibre” (C&A 67-
8) by stressing that they had the proper idea of culture, “the idea of beauty and of a 
human nature perfect on all sides” (67-8).  Arnold even goes so far as to personify 
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culture; indeed he uses phrases such as “culture says…(C&A 65)” and “culture shows…”  
(C&A 71) which is a dramatic, performative way of describing culture.  That is, by 
personifying culture and giving it the power of speech Arnold is making it as real, 
human, and capable of agency as possible.  Clearly there is an ambiguity to this term 
culture, its definition and its aim, and in order for us to understand Arnold’s meaning and 
what Arnold means by “perfection,” he feels we need a certain perception and moral 
receptivity.  Therefore, Arnold insists on the importance of critical perception for a 
proper understanding of culture and its pursuit of perfection.   
Culture is a study and pursuit of perfection, which has as its characters sweetness 
and light.  Arnold defines sweetness and light as beauty and intelligence (C&A 66). 
However, the phrase “sweetness and light” is taken from Swift’s Battle of the Books.  In 
this satire Swift tells the story of the bee and the spider, the ancients and the moderns, 
who were battling each other.  The way in which each conducted him or herself in this 
battle is of importance.  The spider, who “boasted of not being obliged to any other 
creature, but of drawing and spinning out all from himself…produced nothing but 
wrangling and satire” while the bee “went straight to nature, gathering his support from 
the flowers of the field and the garden, without damage to them…had produced honey 
and wax and furnished mankind with ‘the two noblest of things, which are sweetness and 
light’” (Ward and Trent, et al).  The OED captures the disposition that a person with 
“sweetness” should have, according to Arnold, which includes characteristics such as 
“pleasantness…graciousness, gentleness, kindliness [and] mildness” (OED Online).  
Arnold’s “light” resonates with several of the OED’s definitions as well, such as “divine 
favour…to reach full understanding…to be converted…to make known” (OED Online).  
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The terms are most notable for their biblical and intellectual dimensions of which Arnold 
was most certainly aware and which clearly demonstrate who his primary audience is.  
Sweetness and light lend themselves to a definition of Arnold’s culture that is not elitist 
in the exclusionary but in the aspirational sense.  That is to say, the characters of 
sweetness and light keep Arnold’s culture from becoming something vulgar or elitist and 
exclusionary, available only to the few or to the uninterested many.  As Arnold says, 
culture, whose pursuit is perfection and therefore whose pursuit is sweetness and light, 
“works differently.  It [culture] does not try to teach down to the level of inferior classes, 
it does not try to win them for this or that sect of its own, with ready-made judgments and 
watchwords.  It seeks to do away with classes” (C&A 79).  That is, culture encourages the 
birth of intellectuals from various social classes whose members are educated in an 
environment which encourages them to view social and political problems from various 
perspectives.  Moreover, sweetness and light imply a high standard, an education and a 
nature that has previously been regarded as elitist, but it is a high standard presented to 
the masses as an ideal.  Although there are indications of Arnold’s awareness of his social 
role or responsibility in “The Function of Criticism at the Present Time,” it is really in 
Culture and Anarchy where this sense of duty is fully expressed and explored.  He says 
that “men [and women] are all members of one great whole, and the sympathy which is 
in human nature will not allow one member to be indifferent to the rest” (C&A 62).  
Although the problems that universalising can provoke are evident here, Arnold’s main 
concern, and rightly so, is with society’s health which is dependent upon everyone.  
Rather than simplifying the idea of perfection, so that the masses may understand and 
seek to attain it, Arnold challenges them to pursue sweetness and light, beauty and 
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intelligence, so that they can understand his idea of perfection while the standard of 
perfection remains elevated and elusive.  Sweetness and light encourage a critical 
perception and a proper conception of culture and its benefits.  Moreover, a critical 
perception is crucial to understanding Arnold’s idea of culture and to his argument that it 
can improve society.  In order to achieve a critical perception we must have “a finely 
tempered nature” (C&A 66).  This nature is achieved through sweetness and light, so that 
we may acquire “exactly the notion of perfection as culture brings us to conceive it” 
(C&A 66).  Arnold’s insistence prepares the reader to “accept” his version of culture, 
which is distinct from that culture “which is founded solely on the scientific passion for 
knowing” (C&A 60).   
 Arnold’s essay titled “Sweetness and Light” performs what it prescribes.  That is, 
Arnold writes in such a way that the reader needs a critical perception to “get” what 
Arnold is prescribing.  For example, his definition of culture as the study of perfection 
(C&A 59) is an answer that leads to more questions.  Arnold insists on a critical 
perception so that we “get” what he is saying, and so that we “see” the object, that is 
culture, as it really is.  He is purposely elusive, telling us first what culture is so that the 
opportunity arises for the reader to ask questions. What does it mean to study perfection 
and what is perfection anyway?  Arnold takes the reader on a journey of questions and 
answers, of conceptions and misconceptions, in order that we may achieve a critical 
understanding of culture and how it can benefit society.  That is, Arnold insists on a 
critical perception in order that we may see culture as it really is.  However, seeing 
culture as it really is, insisting on a critical perception, is complicated.  A passage in On 
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Translating Homer (1861) stresses Arnold’s insistence on the critical perception and his 
recognition of how complicated it is. 
The ‘thing itself’ with which one is here dealing,—the critical perception of 
poetic truth [perfection],—is of all things the most volatile, elusive, and 
evanescent; by even pressing too impetuously after it, one runs the risk of losing 
it. The critic of poetry should have the finest tact, the nicest moderation, the most 
free, flexible, and elastic spirit imaginable; he should be indeed the ‘ondoyant et 
divers,’ the undulating and diverse being of Montaigne. 
 (“On Translating Homer,” 194)  
Clearly a critical perception is crucial to understanding Arnold’s idea of culture and 
perfection, and by drawing on Montaigne, the subtle, skeptical creator of the modern 
essay, Arnold implies a rigorous, but patient pursuit of the basis and nature of knowledge.  
However, it is, as Arnold concedes, “most volatile, elusive, and evanescent.”  I would 
argue that this is one of the most important functions of sweetness and light, of that finely 
tempered nature that Arnold discusses.  As characteristics of perfection, sweetness and 
light are what culture strives for.  That is, instead of trying to focus on the end, on 
pinning down a particular idea or theory, sweetness and light insist on a notion of 
perfection that stresses “a growing and a becoming [and this] is the character of 
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perfection as culture conceives it” (C&A 62).  Robbins reinforces this point: “[t]hat 
perfection as a goal cannot be attained, Arnold knows and says.  To conceive of it, 
however, free of doctrinal or doctrinaire rigidity, can aid man in an amoeboid progress 
towards a realisable goal, ‘the humanisation of man in society’” (APF 14).  Critical 
perception is important here, not only to understand sweetness and light, but to 
understand Arnold’s culture as an active, unfinishable process.   
In order to clarify culture, its characteristics and its aim, Arnold pairs it with other 
notions and proceeds to compare and contrast culture with these notions.  The importance 
of critical perception is obvious because it is the element that can perceive the similarities 
and differences between two concepts and it is the element that can reveal where 
sweetness and light lie and interplay.  The hope is, I would argue, that if the reader can 
use a critical perception to see other objects as they really are, then the reader can see 
culture as it really is.  Moreover, if the reader can see one “thing” accurately then s/he 
can see or has already seen the web of relations around it.  For example, in the following 
passage, Arnold acknowledges religion’s public and private contributions to society and 
admits to similarities between religion and culture. 
And religion, the greatest and most important of the efforts by which the human 
race has manifested its impulse to perfect itself,—religion, that voice of the 
deepest human experience,—does not only enjoin and sanction the aim which is 
the great aim of culture, the aim of setting ourselves to ascertain what perfection 
is, and to make it prevail; but also, in determining generally in what human 
perfection consists, religion comes to a conclusion identical with that which 
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culture,—culture seeking the determination of this question through all the voices 
of human experience which have been heard upon it, of art, science, poetry, 
philosophy, history, as well as of religion, in order to give a greater fullness and 
certainty to its solution,—likewise reaches.  (C&A 61)  
Although Arnold concedes the similarities between culture and religion in this passage, 
as he performs a quest as well as describing one, he is also sensitive to the likely protests 
that Victorian society, largely frustrated with religion, would express against such a 
claim, while preparing the reader to accept culture as a better alternative to religion’s 
failed attempt at human perfection.  As Collini puts it, “the Victorian reading public 
could be stirred by religion as by no other subject…[and] Many of the great intellectual 
controversies of the century were either directly about religion, or else were given an 
extra dimension of intensity by their bearing on religious belief” (Arnold 93).  We sense 
here Arnold’s perception of society’s dissatisfaction with and distrust of religion, and he 
wants to embrace this moment in time so that, instead of completely rejecting religion, 
English society can recognize that their disillusionment is necessary if a deeper and more 
meaningful life is to take its place.  He also recognizes that both religion and culture 
acknowledge that human perfection is within us:  “Religion says: The kingdom of God is 
within you; and culture, in a like manner, places human perfection in an internal 
condition, in the growth and predominance of our humanity proper” (C&A 61-2; 
emphasis his).  That is, perfection must begin with ourselves and it begins with culture or 
knowing the best that is known and thought.  Moreover, both religion and culture place 
emphasis on perfection as a notion of growing and becoming rather than of having and 
resting (C&A 62), and they both insist on the same obligation of promoting the kingdom 
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of God, thereby increasing and hastening one’s own happiness (C&A 62).  Arnold 
encourages critical perception in order that the reader can recognize both the personal and 
social benefits and limitations of religion as inspiration and aspiration. 
 Indeed, in anticipation of disgruntled cynical or principled secular replies to his 
praise of religion, while consistently reminding the reader that religion has been the best 
attempt at human perfection, Arnold illuminates the limitations of religion and the 
limitations of a non-critical reliance on religion. 
Indeed, the strongest plea for the study of perfection as pursued by culture, the 
clearest proof of the actual inadequacy of the idea of perfection held by the 
religious organisations,—expressing, as I have said, the most widespread effort 
which the human race has yet made after perfection,—is to be found in the state 
of our life and society with these in possession of it…I say that when our religious 
organisations,—which I admit to express the most considerable effort after 
perfection that our race has yet made,—land us in no better result than this [public 
poverty and private opulence], it is high time to examine carefully their idea of 
perfection.  (C&A 71)      
Here, Arnold condones a certain dissatisfaction with religion as this is the necessary first 
step in seeing things as they really are.  However, he concludes this phase of his 
argument by promoting culture.  He says that English reliance on religious organisations 
and on their idea of human perfection is a “mere belief in machinery, and unfruitful [and 
that this can only be] wholesomely counteracted by culture, bent on seeing things as they 
are, and on drawing the human race onwards to a more complete, a harmonious 
 41
perfection” (C&A 71).  Religion possesses some sweetness, some light, and a critical 
perception can recognize this while also recognizing religion’s limitations.  Arnold 
advocates for “a harmonious expansion of all the powers which make the beauty and 
worth of human nature” (C&A 62; emphasis his), which is consistent with Humboldtian 
“many-sided” criticism and inquiry, whereas Trilling points out that “religion puts an 
exclusive emphasis on merely a few powers or even on only one—the moral” (268).  
Arnold implies a need for balance between openness and moral essentialism that only 
culture, with critical perception as its tool, can discern.  
The difference between religion and culture lies in the idea of disinterestedness.  
While both religion’s and culture’s aim is human perfection, Arnold argues that in 
Victorian society the religious or spiritual powers have been stressed at the expense of 
other human powers and that religious organisations have become fanatical and 
inflexible, mechanical even, making their idea of perfection constraining and dogmatic.  
What Arnold felt was beautiful about religion has been depreciated and tainted by 
representatives from dominant groups.  For Arnold, the beauty of religion has become 
connected to interests, and this is dangerous because interest is so often the illusion of 
community and the reality of domination (Findlay 3).  Moreover, these representatives 
opt for empty conformity and this is, Arnold would argue, style without substance.  The 
result is a certain vulgarity, in which faith has become, at best, a faith in outward 
circumstances and machinery, and at worst, an aestheticization of the interests of 
representatives of dominant groups.  Here, culture differs in that it promotes the 
development of all human faculties, a free play of these faculties, with a focus on the 
process rather than on the end, thereby portraying the necessary disinterestedness that 
 42
Arnold introduced in “The Function of Criticism at The Present Time.”  Culture 
encourages a perfection which has as its characters sweetness and light, whose tendency 
is towards that receptivity, which “enables a man to see” (C&A 71).  Here, Arnold notes 
Oxford’s failure, despite his deep love for the place, “to seize one truth—the truth that 
beauty and sweetness are essential characters of a complete human perfection” (C&A 73).  
That is, his idea of perfection must have sweetness and light as its distinctive properties.  
Oxford is right but defeated nonetheless; Oxford uses its detachment to see clearly, but it 
cannot carry the day with the public while remaining within its sanctuary. Thus Arnold 
prepares the reader to see the need for public intellectuals to go forth, go public, as 
Arnold is doing, after the kind of intellectual and moral preparation that Oxford offers its 
scholars.  It is also important to note that while Arnold is criticising religion and its 
limitations, and while culture is often seen by some and attributed to him as an alternative 
to religion, he is also reserving a permanent and necessary space for faith.  After all, 
perfection lies in all voices of human experience, including devout ones, and Arnold 
recognizes that those who have a flexible understanding of faith rather than a dogmatic 
one will be more likely to “see” the value of culture and its contribution to a healthy 
society.  Critical perception is crucial here as that faculty which insists on seeing the 
object as it really is, as that faculty which challenges any dogmatic, unswerving 
allegiance to a particular organisation, and as that faculty which encourages culture and 
disinterestedness, and discourages when it cannot disallow blind partisanship. 
A misconception of culture leads to a misconception of perfection, which Arnold 
argues is painfully recognisable in Victorian society.   A critical perception enables a 
recognition of misconception in order to see the object as it really is.  Moreover, he 
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recognizes that his claim for culture and its function in society will meet resistance.  He 
says,   
The idea of perfection as inward condition of the mind and spirit is at variance 
with the mechanical and material civilisation in esteem with us, and nowhere, as I 
have said, so much in esteem as with us.  The idea of perfection as a general 
expansion of the human family is at variance with our strong individualism, our 
hatred of all limits to the unrestrained swing of the individual’s personality, our 
maxim of ‘every man for himself’.  Above all, the idea of perfection as a 
harmonious expansion of human nature is at variance with our want of flexibility, 
with our inaptitude for seeing more than one side of a thing, with our intense 
energetic absorption in the particular pursuit we happen to be following.  (C&A 
63; emphasis his) 
Again, religion and culture have something in common, namely their struggle against the 
selfish and crudely empiricist response to a less immediately practical version of human 
perfection.  Laissez-faire economics, “a phrase expressive of the principle that 
government should not interfere with the action of individuals, esp. in industrial affairs 
and in trade” (OED online), had given rise in Victorian England to more sweeping 
impatience with regulation or control of any sort.  As Collini states, Arnold is “concerned 
less with particular policies than with the deeper attitudes they expressed…[which 
include] exaggerated individualism, low aspiration…a kind of hubris…the ethos of 
popular Liberalism…proud of its material achievements and dismissive of cultivation and 
refinement…” (Arnold 81).  In the case of laissez-faire economics, the reaction against a 
 44
feeling of too much government restriction was a selfish and empiricist response and 
eventually state non-interference was regarded as essential to the operation of the “free” 
market.  For religion, and more specifically culture, Arnold challenges individualistic 
attitudes that are concerned with personal gain and closed-minded pursuits that cannot 
see all sides of a thing.  He even criticises the bad intellectual of Jacobinism whose ways 
include “violent indignation with the past, abstract systems of renovation applied 
wholesale, a new doctrine drawn up in black and white for elaborating down to the very 
details a rational society for the future” (C&A 76).  Arnold argues that the ways of 
Jacobinism lead to narrow thinking and narrow ideas.  Also, similar to faith whose major 
currents follow and are named for the leader who began or pushed forth the idea, 
Jacobinism promotes the same way of thinking.  Arnold insists that one must see not only 
the good side of a person or idea, but the limited and transient side as well (C&A 77) and 
he scolds the reader for lacking the critical perception needed to recognize the bad habits 
that have developed in Victorian society.  Culture and Anarchy indicates Arnold’s desire 
to acknowledge and to challenge what some have argued and might still argue is a rather 
lofty goal for culture. 
 Critical perception also creates the intellectual situation of which the creative 
power can properly avail itself so that the best ideas prevail.  That is, by inspiring a 
pursuit of sweetness and light, Arnold creates the intellectual situation of which the 
creative power can properly avail itself so that the best idea(s) can prevail.  Arnold’s best 
idea is of course culture, which holds its ideal of human perfection.  It is only a critical 
perception that can see value in sweetness and light, as they are important factors in 
creating a healthy and responsible society.  By having an affinity for beauty and 
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sweetness, we also experience a direct “sentiment against hideousness and rawness” 
(C&A 73).  The society Arnold is targeting is one concerned with machinery and is 
preoccupied with industrial superiority and personal wealth.  Overemphasising money 
and machinery teaches “a man to value himself not on what he is, not on his progress in 
sweetness and light, but on the number of railroads he has constructed, or the bigness of 
the tabernacle he has built…[which is] nothing excellent” (C&A 75; emphasis his).  
Perhaps Arnold had in mind Isambard Kingdom Brunel, the archetypal captain of 
industry during the Victorian period in England, whose record of achievements only 
mentions the tunnels, ships, and bridges he engineered and mentions virtually nothing of 
the type of person he was (Rolt).  Clearly Brunel’s value is deeply rooted in what he 
constructed and not in who he was.  Arnold feared a society that placed too much value in 
this “machinery.”  An inadequate situation, an inadequate mind, cannot produce the best 
ideas and critical perception is important if we are to change what we value.  Arnold 
creates an awareness of dissatisfaction, so that old ideas and habits can be left and new 
ideas and agendas can be sought.  Once dissatisfaction is realized, culture, that is, the 
pursuit of perfection and of sweetness and light, can begin.  Arnold argues that by 
pursuing sweetness and light, one pursues perfection as culture conceives it.  He also uses 
examples of historical moments in which sweetness and light were worked for and as a 
result, were moments of happiness. 
If I have not shrunk from saying that we must work for sweetness and light, so 
neither have I shrunk from saying that we must have a broad basis, must have 
sweetness and light for as many as possible.  Again and again I have insisted how 
those are the happy moments of humanity, how those are the marking epochs of a 
 46
people’s life, how those are the flowering times for literature and art and all the 
creative power of genius, when there is a national glow of life and thought, when 
the whole of society is in the fullest measure permeated by thought, sensible to 
beauty, intelligent and alive.  Only it must be real thought and real beauty; real 
sweetness and real light.  (C&A 79; emphasis his) 
We hear Arnold’s response to accusations propelled towards him by Edward Miall, editor 
of the Nonconformist, of his sympathies with the oppressor, not the oppressed (Coulling 
187) and of accusations from the Leeds Mercury which described Arnold and the man of 
culture as pretentious and conceited (Coulling 187).  Indeed this is certainly, in part, a 
discreet educator’s adaptation of utilitarian discourse.  However, as I discussed before, 
rather than simplifying the idea of perfection, so that the masses may understand, Arnold 
challenges them to pursue sweetness and light, beauty and intelligence, so that they can 
understand his idea of perfection while the standard of perfection remains elevated if 
admittedly elusive.  He promotes education so that culture and perfection can be available 
to all, as it is necessary to a unified humanity.  As Simon Heffer clarified in a talk on The 
Westminster Hour (BBC) on June 15, 2003,  
Arnold recognised that culture could be 'an engine of social and class distinction', 
though that is why he wished to spread it out as far as he possibly could. He called 
this propagation of education the extension of 'sweetness and light'. 'Sweetness 
and light', to the modern ear, sounds almost twee. But he could not have chosen a 
better metaphor and it is, beyond even his poetry itself, Arnold's most famous 
phrase. It conveys the mellifluousness and harmony of the highest aesthetics and 
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the brightness and warmth of true civilisation: what Winston Churchill, in a 
memorable speech in 1940 when he sought to describe the counterpoint to Hitler's 
chill darkness, called the 'broad sunlit uplands'. To Arnold, sweetness and light, or 
learning for learning's sake, had a religious purpose. (“Culture and Anarchy 
Revisited”)  
The legacy of Newman is apparent here, as well as a sense of nostalgia for Newman’s 
movement, which created and nourished a “keen desire for beauty and sweetness” (C&A 
74).  We also sense, in his use of terms like “real sweetness” and “real light,” his view 
that others have gotten it wrong and he knows what the “real” is.  Moreover, Arnold 
defends his culture against attacks that claim it is elitist and impractical, by assigning to 
culture a “broad basis.”  Culture, as the pursuit of perfection, the pursuit of sweetness and 
light, creates an atmosphere, or intellectual situation in which men (and women) “may 
use ideas, as it uses them itself, freely,—nourished, and not bound by them” (C&A 79).  
 Arnold’s main concern in preparing the public to accept culture is to promote 
sweetness and light, to work towards sweetness and light.  However, he also recognizes 
that sweetness and light have to be accessible to as many as possible and this is a 
common theme throughout Culture and Anarchy.  But Arnold’s fear of anarchy is 
apparent here too.  Arnold’s chapter “Hebraism and Hellenism” focuses on this second 
goal by bringing his argument back into balance, by stressing conduct in addition to 
stressing intelligence and beauty.  In other words, “Hebraism and Hellenism” is Arnold’s 
attempt to explain perfection, and therefore culture more fully, and to justify why it 
works—because it manages excess and puts Arnold’s fear of anarchy to rest.  The stress 
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is placed on the balance of Hebraism and Hellenism.  As Jacobowitz points out, “For 
Arnold, an excess of Hebraism which entered English society through Puritanism was 
responsible for the harmful proliferation of a social machinery which may have made the 
nation strong, but neglected the spiritual growth of its people” (Jacobowitz).  As with 
sweetness and light, and culture, the aim of promoting Hebraism and Hellenism is human 
perfection.  “Hebraism and Hellenism” contributes to our understanding of Arnold’s 
“perfection.”  As Arnold points out, “Hebraism and Hellenism are, neither of them, the 
law of human development…they are, each of them, contributions to human 
development” (C&A 133).  Further, each is important to man’s and woman’s betterment 
or perfection because “by alterations of Hebraism and Hellenism, of a man’s intellectual 
and moral impulses, of the effort to see things as they really are and the effort to win 
peace by self-conquest, the human spirit proceeds” (C&A 134).  But what are Hebraism 
and Hellenism?  Arnold’s “Hebraism” certainly includes characteristics of the Hebrew 
language, the attributes of the Hebrew people, their character or nature and their method 
of thought or system of religion (OED Online).  What is more notable is the OED’s 
inclusion of Arnold’s application of Hebraism as “that mode of human thought and action 
of which the ancient Hebrew is taken as the type; the moral, as opposed to the 
intellectual, theory of life” (OED Online).  In addition, Arnold’s “Hellenism” includes 
characteristics of the Greek language, the imitation or adoption of Greek characteristics, 
and the national character or spirit of the Greeks (OED Online).  And again Arnold’s 
application of Hellenism as “that form of culture, or ideal of life, of which the ancient 
Greek is taken as the type” (OED Online) is included.  These entries, in what remains a 
very Victorian lexicon, attest to the historical and referential complexity of these two 
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terms, and their strong connections still attest today to Arnold’s handling of them.  The 
OED gives a useful (if starkly summary) sense that Arnold’s emphasis on Hebraic energy 
and Hellenic intelligence is both reductive and expansive.  Arnold selects one 
characteristic from many in the case of each tradition, but also brings out the force of 
each term by coupling, contrasting, and glossing further the traditions in which they 
feature prominently.  
In Culture and Anarchy Arnold gives various definitions of the terms, which 
demonstrates both their complexity and their interdependence.  First he says that 
Hebraism and Hellenism are each a force (C&A 126), Hebraism being the “energy 
driving at practice…[a] sense of the obligation of duty, self-control, and work…[and an] 
earnestness in going manfully with the best light we have” (C&A 126), and Hellenism  as 
“the intelligence driving at those ideas which are…the basis of right practice, the ardent 
sense for all the new and changing combinations of them which man’s development 
brings with it, the indomitable impulse to know and adjust them perfectly” (C&A 126).  
He then goes on to say that Hellenism’s “uppermost idea…is to see things as they really 
are” and Hebraism’s “uppermost idea…is conduct and obedience” (C&A 127).  Arnold 
finally states each term’s main idea.  “The governing idea of Hellenism is spontaneity of 
consciousness; that of Hebraism, strictness of conscience” (C&A 128).  But as Collini 
points out, it is helpful to examine what each term attacks.  He summarizes that 
“Hebraism attacks wrongdoing, moral laxness, and weakness of will; Hellenism attacks 
ignorance, ugliness, and rigidity of mind” (Arnold 82).  Arguably, Arnold sensed an 
imbalance himself following in the project of “Sweetness and Light” and felt that “by 
bringing into prominence the forces of ‘sweetness and light’ he would find it possible to 
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conceive of a goal or ideal of perfection, in which an enlightened Hebraism would play a 
vital and harmonious role” (Robbins APF 30).  While seeing things as they really are is 
important to his definition of culture, and while both beauty and intelligence are crucial 
to creating the intellectual situation of which the creative power can avail itself so that the 
best ideas prevail, Arnold also wants to insist on conduct, on useful activity in preparing 
for the next phase of human development.  Arnold anticipated the arguments that would 
follow, which criticized him for putting too much stress on the Hellenic rather than the 
Hebraic, on the thinking rather than on the doing.   By coupling Hellenism with 
Hebraism, an enticing synthesis of complementary forms of authority and practice, and 
by focusing on conduct, on obedience, Arnold is preparing the reader, or perhaps 
reminding the reader, of his second claim while also preparing the reader to accept the 
idea of the public intellectual.   
Arnold’s second claim follows logically as he argues for the necessity of culture 
as a historically useful activity in preparing for the next phase of human development by 
exercising a free play of the mind and by knowing the best that is thought and known in 
the world.  For culture to be a historically useful tool in human development, Arnold 
argues that one must require people to require more of themselves.  Arnold’s culture puts 
selfish and individualistic attitudes under the microscope and challenges people to do 
something useful, something that will contribute to the pursuit of human perfection.  In 
the essay titled “Doing as One Likes” Arnold concedes that in his essay “Sweetness and 
Light” he dealt with sweetness (beauty) more than light (intelligence) and explains that 
“it evidently remains to speak also of intelligence, or light, as a character of perfection” 
(81).  Arnold recognizes an intellectual deficiency in England largely due to a lack of 
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State action, a lack of a collective authority.  That is, he feels that the English national 
character, without the authority of State power and action, lacks intelligence and power 
and as his desire is for the ideal of human perfection, to Arnold the English national 
character falls short.  In this essay, Arnold argues for the idea of the State as an entity 
which can assume a certain disinterestedness free from class interests, and which can 
represent a collective and communal “best self” (C&A 99)—note the cleverness of 
rehabilitating selfishness as a form of beneficial unselfishness—that is essential to 
Arnold’s definition of progress as a process of growing and becoming.  This is a sort of 
prescription for useful activity or culture, which is criticized for being an activity of 
inactivity, a balance of the physical, mental, spiritual capacities, which not only 
discourages doing as one likes, but which encourages seeking a collective “best self.”  As 
Collini aptly states, by promoting a free play of the mind and an engagement with the 
best that is known and thought, Arnold hoped “to enlarge the horizons and expand the 
sympathies of all ‘sides’, optimistic that a mind with access to the standards established 
by ‘the best that has been thought and said’ could never rest content with partisan 
simplicities” (Arnold 9).      
As sweetness helps one to see the object as it really is and as it helps to create the 
intellectual situation of which the creative power can properly avail itself so that the best 
ideas prevail, light exercises the free play of the mind and insists on knowing the best that 
is thought and known in the world.  What Arnold is doing, in a sense, is educating the 
imagination and re-imagining education.  That is, he advocates a free play of the mind 
while simultaneously insisting on knowing the best that is thought and known in the 
world.  I mentioned earlier that for Arnold, our ordinary selves and experiences are not 
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good enough, and doing as one likes is ordinary, and as we shall see, too often anarchical.  
Northrop Frye states that  
Matthew Arnold pointed out that we live in two environments, an actual social 
one and an ideal one, and that the ideal one can only come from something 
suggested in our education.  [Therefore we live] in both a social and a cultural 
environment, and only the cultural environment, the world we study in the arts 
and sciences, can provide the kind of standards and values we need if we’re to do 
anything better than adjust. (Educate Imagination 66) 
Frye agrees that Arnold’s culture, as it gives us light (C&A 82) also provides the kind of 
standards and values needed to proceed in the pursuit of perfection, which is better than 
merely “adjusting” to change.  By using a word like “adjust” Frye implies the need to 
engage with issues that surround us and to consider the connection between literature and 
life in order to educate the imagination and to stop merely doing as one likes.   
“Doing As One Likes” is a direct response to Mr. John Bright’s “assertion of 
personal liberty” (C&A 83; emphasis his) and his allegiance to the Constitution “which 
stops and paralyses any power in interfering with the free action of individuals” (C&A 
83).  Arnold abhorred this blind praise of the Constitution and feared the anarchical 
results which would surely follow the free action of individuals, particularly members of 
the working class.  As Heffer states, “Arnold feared that without education people would 
be subject to 'random and ill-regulated action'.  Through lack of information, untrained 
thinking, or limited experience they might perceive a state of affairs as being ideal and 
beneficial when, in fact, it was rotten and harmful” (“Culture and Anarchy Revisted”).  
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For example Arnold ridicules the excess of Bradlaugh who is “capable…of running us all 
into great dangers and confusion” (C&A 98) and who, as “notorious”, is another negative 
example that Arnold thinks is far different from, and inferior to, his role as public 
intellectual.  Therefore, Arnold tackles that form of action which is not intelligent, and 
which is not a useful activity for preparing for the next phase of human development.   
Arnold responds first, however, to those who criticize his idea of culture, who say 
that it is “not practical”  (C&A 81) and “that it is very easy to sit in one’s study and find 
fault with the course of modern society” (C&A 81).  Against this charge of impractical 
actions, Arnold highlights modern society’s actions which have neither sweetness nor 
light. 
So that if I can show what my opponents call rough or coarse action, but what I 
would rather call random and ill-regulated action,—action with insufficient light, 
action pursued because we like to be doing something and doing it as we please, 
and do not like the trouble of thinking and the severe constraint of any kind of 
rule,—if I can show this to be, at the present moment, a practical mischief and 
dangerous to us, then I have found a practical use for light in correcting this state 
of things, and have only to exemplify how, in cases which fall under everybody’s 
observations, it may deal with it. (82-3)          
Arnold clearly distinguishes between different forms of action.  As Robbins states, it was 
important for Arnold “to distinguish between straw-fire enthusiasms for action as such, 
and a reasoned, informed commitment to action of a necessary and inevitable kind” 
(Arnoldian Principle 17).  Robbins also notes Arnold’s sentiments towards ill-regulated 
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action that are identified as early as 1848 in a letter to Clough which states, “the present 
spectacle in France is a fine one; mostly so indeed to the historical swift-kindling man, 
who is not over-haunted by the pale thought, that, after all man’s shiftings of posture, 
restat vivere “ (Letters 86).  What both the 1848 passage in Letters and the passage in 
“Doing As One Likes” have in common is Arnold’s stress on the importance of “right 
action based on right thinking” (Arnoldian Principle 18).  Arnold not only challenges his 
public to scrutinize their actions in order to ensure that they are indeed useful, he also 
warns against the dangers of anarchy and prepares the reader to pursue a “best self,” 
which can only be understood and accomplished by an educated public because bad 
“habits make it hard for us to come at the idea of a high best self, of a paramount 
authority [in religion, literature and politics]” (C&A 114).   
We discussed earlier the necessity of critical perception and Arnold expands this 
idea here by showing the anarchy which results from a misconception of light.  That is, 
misunderstood light results in anarchy.  English society believes that doing as one likes is 
a clear-sighted way of living.  A belief in machinery, a belief in personal liberty and a 
belief in freedom in and of itself all “tends to anarchy” (C&A 85), which is certainly not 
useful in preparing for the next phase of human development.  The result of these beliefs 
is a renewed need for culture, if culture,  
which simply means trying to perfect oneself, and one’s mind as part of oneself, 
brings us light, and if light shows us that there is nothing so very blessed in 
merely doing as one likes, that the worship of the mere freedom to do as one likes 
is worship of machinery, that the really blessed thing is to like what right reason 
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ordains, and to follow her authority, then we have got a practical benefit out of 
culture.  We have got a much wanted principle, a principle of authority, to 
counteract the tendency to anarchy which seems to be threatening us.  (C&A 89) 
Authority is introduced here as that principle whose function it is to counteract anarchy.  
Arnold’s fear of anarchy is apparent and he is preparing the reader to acknowledge the 
lack of intelligence in English society and to recognize the benefits of a State authority 
with the humanizing face and mission of culture.  Arnold recognizes the need for 
authority, but he also understands the importance of a collective pursuit of perfection.  As 
Heffer states:  
If the state had to impose a social order that would prevent anarchy, it was better 
it did it with the wholehearted consent of the people. Such consent, he [Arnold] 
knew, would be supplied only if the people's idea of perfection, and that of those 
who ruled them, happened to coincide. Both parties, the governors and the 
governed, would need greater, and matching, intelligence. (“Culture and Anarchy 
Revisited”) 
Light or intelligence is the character of perfection that is necessary for a public, with a 
tendency towards anarchy, to see the benefits of a responsible State authority.  An 
educated public will have confidence in State authority because they have confidence in 
culture as a pursuit of perfection, independent of individual or class interest.  Moreover, 
culture is the means by which each class can become unified in the idea of a best self, 
which the State will represent.  As Arnold clarifies, the State is “the nation in its 
collective and corporate character, entrusted with stringent powers for the general 
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advantage, and controlling individual wills in the name of an interest wider than that of 
individuals” (C&A 83) and which exercises “right reason” (C&A 89).  Arnold’s argument 
is for accountability.  Arnold believes in a State authority, inspired by light and 
recognized as necessary by those that have light, in order to push society into its next 
phase of human development. 
 In order for the public to put its faith, with its religious as well as social 
inflections, in a State authority, Arnold blurs and perhaps even eradicates the lines 
between social classes.  He claims to transcend class interest in favour of a unified and 
collective interest.  However, as Findlay points out, interest is often the illusion of 
community and the reality of domination and he identifies Burke’s concern with “the 
displacement of Protestant ‘interest’ by Protestant ‘ascendancy’ in Ireland (O’Brien 527) 
as an ominous threat to social tolerance and civil society” (Findlay 3).  By arguing that 
Arnold transcends interest, we can argue that he poses a threat to social tolerance and 
civil society.  However, Findlay also asks, can Arnold “save interest from hardening into 
ascendancy by somehow assimilating it within disinterestedness?” (Findlay 3).  I would 
argue that Arnold’s idea of a best self does transcend “interest” in the dominating sense, 
in that it has its grounding in culture, which is a disinterested endeavour “to come at 
reason and the will of God by means of reading, observing, and thinking” (C&A 94).  As 
I stated before, the idea of the best self transcends interest in a paradoxical way by 
suggesting that working towards a fluid idea of perfection, a fluid idea of a best self, is in 
everyone’s best interest.  If authority rested in one of the classes, the aristocracy, the 
middle class, or the working class, the result would be a lack of growth, a lack of ideas 
that are essential for an epoch of expansion, like the present in which Arnold must work.  
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For example, Arnold states that although the aristocratic class has some good qualities, it 
lacks light and therefore it lacks ideas necessary for growth and for the nourishing of 
Arnold’s version of culture.  The middle class rests in self-satisfaction, and puts its 
emphasis on having and resting rather than on growing and becoming.  Because culture 
puts its emphasis on the pursuit of perfection, as “a perpetual advance in beauty and 
wisdom”, middle class values are also at variance with Arnold’s culture.  Finally, the 
working class, “pressed constantly by the hard daily compulsion of material wants” is, 
according to Arnold, “still an embryo, of which no one can yet quite foresee the final 
development; and from its not having the same experience and self knowledge as the 
aristocratic and middle classes” (C&A 97).  Arnold illuminates the deficiencies of each 
class in order to prepare the reader to accept the idea of authority resting in the State, 
which represents a collective best self.  Culture is therefore necessary as that useful 
activity which prepares the population for the next phase of human development, and 
here it recognises a need for authority to rest in a responsible entity, which has both 
sweetness and light.   
Arnold’s third claim with reference to “Barbarians, Philistines, Populace” and 
“Hebraism and Hellenism” insists on the exemplary and transformative force of culture in 
improving ethical, political, as well as cultural standards, and it does so by promoting 
disinterestedness, and by encouraging an engagement with ever fresh knowledge.  Here 
he brings his claims from “Sweetness and Light” and “Doing as One Likes” into the 
practical sphere.  Arnold begins “Barbarians, Philistines, Populace” claiming to be a 
“plain, unsystematic writer, without a philosophy” (C&A 102), with a modesty that is 
difficult to believe but useful in producing an inclusive feeling in the reader.  He is 
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revealing, in his opinion, the faults of the aristocratic class, middle class, and working 
class, and prescribing culture as the agent that will improve the standards and lives of 
each class, in particular the middle class.  As we discussed earlier, each class has some 
particular quality or qualities that render it incapable of positive growth and 
transformation.  There is an insistence on the need for culture as a remedy to the 
“dismal…[and] staunch” (C&A 105) characteristics of these classes.  It is culture that 
brings the idea of the State as a principle and centre of authority.  For Arnold to be able to 
suggest the idea of the State, he has to address each class which “deem[s] itself fit to 
provide the principle of authority and to act upon it” (Trilling 276).  So Arnold challenges 
the “fitness” of each class for such a position of authority and he encourages a sort of 
transcendental idea of rising above classes in order to promote the idea of a whole 
community, which is the State (Trilling 276).  Each class, for Arnold, has faults and is 
“guilty” of resting in an ordinary state; choosing one class to represent authority would, 
for Arnold, ensure endless, useless competition and conflict.  Therefore culture, which 
suggests the idea of the State, recognises that there is no basis for firm, responsible power 
in any class’s ordinary self.  By suggesting a community authority in the idea of the State, 
which is represented by the “best self”, culture ensures transformation while avoiding 
anarchy.  That is, culture acts as both the exemplary and the transformative force for 
improving standards as it encourages society to rest authority with a best self that requires 
a continuous growing and becoming.   
In Matthew Arnold, Trilling devotes an entire chapter to Culture and Anarchy and 
challenges Arnold’s notion of a “State based on classes voided of interest” (253).  Before 
Arnold can better explain the idea of the State, he illuminates the faults of each class.  For 
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example, the Barbarians or aristocracy, despite being credited with reinvigorating and 
renewing a worn out Europe (C&A 105) “brought with them that staunch individualism, 
as the modern phrase is, and that passion for doing as one likes, [and] the assertion of 
personal liberty” (C&A 105).  Moreover, their culture “was an exterior culture 
mainly…[which] consisted principally in outward gifts and graces, in looks, manners, 
accomplishments, prowess…[and the] inward gifts which had part in it were the most 
exterior…they were courage, a high spirit, self-confidence” (C&A 106).  Although some 
of these qualities are admirable, and Arnold admits this, the Barbarians are not perfect, 
nor do they have the idea of perfection as a growing and becoming.  Arnold knowingly 
chooses a term that has resonant historical implications and which identifies precisely 
those weaknesses which impede perfection.  The OED Online defines a barbarian as “one 
whose language and customs differ from the speaker's; one who has an insufficiency of 
light; one outside the pale of Christian civilization; a rude, wild, uncivilized person; an 
uncultured person, or one who has no sympathy with literary culture.”  Arnold is 
demonstrating that there are, or can be, different ideas about what barbarianism means 
and he anticipates protestations as the aristocracy certainly distinguishes itself from any 
class that is uncivilized or uncultured.  The problem that Arnold identifies is that the 
aristocracy views the love of machinery and exterior accomplishments as perfection.  
There is arrogance in the aristocracy’s ordinary self that puts emphasis on doing as one 
likes.  According to Arnold, the Barbarians’ ethical, political, and cultural standard is not 
high enough and culture, which promotes the “best self,” acts as that exemplary and 
transformative force that improves standards.        
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The Philistines or middle class suffer a similar critique from Arnold; however, it 
is this class, of which Arnold is a part, which he is most concerned with.  The OED 
Online defines “philistine” as “one of an alien warlike people, of uncertain origin, who 
occupied the southern sea-coast of Palestine, and in early times constantly harassed the 
Israelites; (humorously applied to) person(s) regarded as ‘the enemy’, into whose hands 
one may fall, e.g. bailiffs, literary critics, etc.; formerly, also, to the debauched or 
drunken; a person deficient in liberal culture and enlightenment, whose interests are 
chiefly bounded by material and commonplace things.  But often applied contemptuously 
by connoisseurs of any particular art or department of learning to one who has no 
knowledge or appreciation of it; sometimes a mere term of dislike for those whom the 
speaker considers ‘bourgeois’; characteristic of, or of the nature of, the modern 
‘Philistine’; uncultured; commonplace; prosaic.”  This term clarifies Arnold’s disdain for 
his class’s anti-intellectualism.  In “Barbarians, Philistines, Populace,” Arnold says the 
middle class has a certain self-satisfaction about it (C&A 103).  This feeling of self-
satisfaction is a defect in that it eschews “the idea of self-transformation, of growing 
towards some measure of sweetness and light not yet reached” (103).  Further, this term 
“gives the notion of something particularly stiff-necked and perverse in the resistance to 
light and its children” (C&A 105).  The class then, according to Arnold, is lacking 
culture, which Arnold argues is the exemplary and transformative force that is crucial to 
improving standards.   
   Finally, Arnold discusses the Populace, or working class, which is “the mass of 
the people of a community, as distinguished from the titled, wealthy, or educated classes; 
the common people; invidiously, the mob, the rabble” (OED Online).  This class is what 
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Arnold calls “the working class” (C&A 103).  As Arnold says, “The defect of this class 
would be the falling short in what Mr. Frederic Harrison calls those ‘bright powers of 
sympathy and ready powers of action’” (103).  This class, its rising population, its 
unintelligence and vulgarity, its desire to march where it likes, meet where it likes, bawl 
where it likes, and break what it likes (C&A 107) concerns Arnold because its rising 
numbers result in a larger number of the population being uneducated.  An uneducated 
mass will surely not strive for a “best self,” which Arnold argues is necessary for the 
pursuit of perfection.  Here, culture acts as an exemplary and transformative force for 
improving standards, in that it educates the masses to see things as they really are, to do 
away with a love of machinery and of doing as one likes, in order to pursue reason and 
the will of God and to make them prevail.    
Following this division of English society into three distinct classes, Arnold 
proceeds to explain why he did this and reasserts a commonality among all three classes:  
Thus we have got three distinct terms, Barbarians, Philistines, Populace, to 
denote roughly the three great classes into which our society is divided; and 
though this humble attempt at a scientific nomenclature falls, no doubt, very far 
short in precision of what might be required from a writer equipped with a 
complete and coherent philosophy, yet, from a notoriously unsystematic and 
unpretending writer, it will, I trust, be accepted as sufficient. (C&A 107) 
Arnold cleverly undercuts society’s blind love of science and deficient imagination as he 
divides society into distinct and rigid classes, which is obviously problematic, and then 
explains his reasons for doing so are justifiable as a rudimentary adherence to scientific 
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law.  His position is clear in an ironically self-deprecating way.   He follows this 
classification by reminding the reader that an English Barbarian will find in himself both 
something of the Philistine and something of the Populace (C&A 108), thus complicating 
the divisions he has offered.    
Arnold then creates a place for his work as literary critic and promoter of culture.  
He says:  
But in each class there are born a certain number of natures with a curiosity about 
their best self, with a bent for seeing things as they are, for disentangling 
themselves from machinery, for simply concerning themselves with reason and 
the will of God, and doing their best to make these prevail;—for the pursuit, in a 
word, of perfection.  (109)     
These figures, with a bent towards curiosity, are led to culture and are led to an idea of a 
best self.  They are, in a sense, awakened to the realization that there is something better 
than an ordinary self and as a result have the ability to awaken a passive and complacent 
society, to inspire a belief in excellence.  However, in anticipation of Gramsci (1891-
1937) who later claims that everyone can be an intellectual, Arnold is quick to point out 
that this kind of thinking, this idea of the best self, is accessible to all not only to those 
deemed “genius.”  Arnold is quick to clarify, however, as does Gramsci, that although 
everyone is an intellectual, not everyone has the function of an intellectual (Gramsci 3).  
More specifically, there is a distinction that comes with knowing and doing, with 
understanding and being able to have influence over others.  Arnold anticipates this 
concept and this is clear in his identification of “aliens” within each of these classes “who 
 63
are mainly led, not by their class spirit, but by a general humane spirit, by the love of 
human perfection” (110).  Moreover, he asserts that the number of aliens will fluctuate 
based on two things, an innate instinct towards perfection, and outside encouragement.  It 
is important to note Arnold’s version of alien as it is not labour based, as in the Marxian 
tradition within which Gramsci works, but is based in a specialized notion of the 
“humane.”  That is, it accepts individuality even if it goes against the spirit of the age.  
For Arnold, embracing the idea of a best self, or as O’Hara so aptly puts it, “a democracy 
of educated imaginations” (669), and as a result suffering alienation from society is better 
than upholding the status quo and as a result causing one’s individuality to disintegrate.  
What Arnold is doing here is encouraging the masses towards an idea of a best self, while 
persuading them to rest authority with those “aliens” who have a natural inclination and 
curiosity to seek a best self.  Essentially, he both argues for culture, and creates a space 
for himself as a promoter of culture.  In creating this space, those promoters of culture are 
embodiments of a best self and therefore make up the State as the State represents the 
best self.  Arnold creates, then, not only a space for intellectual work, but also an 
authority for literary critics and what we would call the public intellectual.  Therefore, 
while portraying the exemplary and transformative force of culture in improving 
standards, he is also modelling the public intellectual and portraying the exemplary and 
transformative force of this figure in improving standards. 
Arnold’s next chapter in Culture and Anarchy, “Porro Unum Est Necessarium” or 
“The One Thing Needful”, which follows “Hebraism and Hellenism”, directly challenges 
Victorian society to come to its best on all points.  More specifically, he accuses 
Victorian society of adopting the ideal of “the one thing needful” and the narrow attitude 
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which accompanies it.  By making direct reference to the Bible passage Luke 10:42 in his 
title, Arnold is simultaneously condemning a “wrong” version of the one thing needful 
while preparing the reader to accept his “right” version, namely culture.  He is suggesting 
that instead of busying oneself with the unimportant details as Martha did, Victorian 
society should sit, listen, and broaden all sides of human nature.  Perhaps appropriately, 
Arnold’s three claims, the importance of critical perception, the necessity of criticism or 
culture as a historically useful activity in preparing for the next phase of human 
development, and the exemplary and transformative force of critical judgement in 
improving ethical, political, as well as cultural standards, are all brought together if not 
repeated.  As “the currents seem to converge, and together to bear us along towards 
culture” (C&A 151), the space Arnold is trying to create for himself as critic becomes 
more obvious.   
Before prescribing culture, however, Arnold generously supplies the reader with 
the reason why they adopted the ideal of “the one thing needful.”  In the Arnoldian way 
of “here’s the question” and “here’s the answer” Arnold blames Victorian society’s 
misconception on an excess of Hebraism, or strictness of consciousness (C&A 138).  He 
asks “Why, in fact, should good, well-meaning, energetic, sensible people, like the bulk 
of our countrymen, come to have such light belief in right reason, and such an 
exaggerated value of their own independent doing, however crude?” (C&A 138).  He 
answers “because of an exclusive and excessive development in them, without due 
allowance for time, place and circumstance, of that side of human nature…we have given 
the general name of Hebraism”  (C&A 138).  We have heard about the drawbacks of an 
excess of Hebraism before in “Hebraism and Hellenism.”  Indeed he is reiterating a need 
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for culture, for critical perception which will allow, he argues, for a balance of Hebraism 
and Hellenism.  Arnold resurrects religion in this chapter as well, and stresses that 
religion fails because of an excess of Hebraism, strict obedience without necessary 
intelligence, as it leads to disillusionment.  But, optimistic as Arnold often is, he does not 
prescribe doing away with religion or with the Bible; rather, he blames the state of 
Victorian England on misconception—on the way the Bible is read and the way religion 
has been followed or practiced.  Moreover, he challenges those who would argue that 
“‘religion gives fire and strength, and the world wants fire and strength even more than it 
wants sweetness and light’” (C&A 140).  For Arnold, this religion will ultimately fail as it 
is insufficient in a world that is “not all of one piece” (C&A 141).  A fluid understanding 
of ourselves, of the Bible, of religion as culture conceives it and as only culture can 
conceive it, essentially saves religion and English society.  Again, culture, as it provides 
the necessary critical perception, is his antidote to this misconception of religion and of 
Victorian society.   
While Arnold disparages the narrow attitude which accompanies allegiance to the 
notion of “the one thing needful” he is quick to prescribe his own, or the “real” unum 
necessarium (C&A 142).  Arnold’s second claim is restated here, and although he seems 
to be prescribing that which he had previously critiqued, at least Arnold prescribes one 
thing which has many sides and which places its importance in the process, not the end.  
That is, Arnold’s culture has an allegiance to the process of perfection and Arnold argues 
that culture is the one thing needful and is a useful activity in preparing for the next phase 
of human development in that it insists on coming to our (note the implications) best at 
all points, whatever they may be.  And at this point, or Arnold’s point in history, he 
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argues that Hellenism is lacking and should be “more wanted [than Hebraism]” (C&A 
142).  We can see here that, as Arnold prescribes culture as the antidote to a vulgar 
Victorian society by promoting sweetness and light, he also carves out a place for himself 
and his work. 
Arnold’s third claim, regarding the exemplary and transformative force of critical 
judgement in improving standards, is intertwined with Arnold’s fear that his life and 
work will have no place in Victorian society.  Arnold sees a significant and pessimistic 
flaw in having a standard and in viewing that standard as the end.   As Arnold says, “so 
fatal is the notion of possessing, even in the most precious words or standards, the one 
thing needful…and of there being no duty left for us except to make our practice square 
exactly with them” (C&A 145).  Culture promotes a commitment to improving standards.  
For Arnold who is “accused of preaching up a spirit of inaction” (C&A 151), culture 
permits him to “minister to the diseased spirit of [his] time” (C&A 152) as this is a 
society that he has to live in too.    
Arnold’s final chapter in Culture and Anarchy, “Our Liberal Practitioners” is a 
chapter that speaks directly to those who would accuse Arnold of promoting inaction and 
is his attempt at bringing culture into the “practical” sphere in hopes of destabilizing 
things deemed “practical”.  His three claims are, then, put to the test and vindicated.  This 
chapter has a timelessness to it in that it makes us, at all times in history, question the 
values and actions of “our” liberal practitioners and highlights what actions Liberals 
without sweetness and light take.  Arnold criticizes five “practical operations” of the 
Liberals, the disestablishment of the Irish Church, the proposal of the Real Estate 
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Intestacy Bill, the attempt to enable a man to marry his dead wife’s sister, the Liberal 
free-trade policy, and the Liberals’ present pursuit of practical operations (excessive 
Hebraising), which can collectively be summarized as a criticism of Liberal lip service, 
ostentation, and superficiality.  That is, Arnold accuses Liberals of being irresponsibly 
critical, of searching for societal wrongs, magnifying them and classifying them as 
“definite evils” (C&A 157) in order to punish by the use of law.  Arnold argues that this 
use of “mechanical maxim[s]” (C&A 157) encourages individualistic thinking and 
attitudes, and discourages free play of the mind.  Essentially, he accuses the Liberals of 
being illiberal.  Approaching political issues in a non-partisan fashion is much more 
useful and Arnold attempts to demonstrate how culture can achieve this non-partisan 
success towards human perfection.  By not going along with these practical operations 
Arnold shows the critic or public intellectual’s usefulness in the practical sphere.  As 
Arnold claims, as a disseminator of culture, as a public intellectual (the space Arnold is 
determined to make for himself), “we minister better to the diseased spirit of our time by 
leading it to think about the operation of our Liberal friends…than by lending a hand to 
this operation ourselves” (C&A 168).  Here, Arnold is carving a place for himself and the 
public intellectual in politics, the typically “practical” sphere.  Essentially he is arguing 
for the practicality of the public intellectual.   
Arnold’s “Conclusion” to Culture and Anarchy is his one last attempt to convert.  
It is an arguably weak effort as he uses fear mongering, claiming that culture keeps “us” 
safe.  He says “Through culture seems to lie our way, not only to perfection, but even to 
safety” (C&A 180).  Arnold’s fear of anarchy is again apparent here as he anticipates, or 
perhaps presumptuously diagnoses, reader confusion and equates confusion with danger.  
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Moreover, Arnold again addresses the protests against his inaction and stresses that the 
“friends of culture [cannot] expect to take the believers in action by storm” (C&A 183).  
Arnold’s increasing sense of duty and responsibility to the Victorian public, and to 
himself, “of extricating and elevating our best self, in the progress of humanity towards 
perfection” (C&A 180), is somewhat overshadowed by his preoccupation with repressing 
anarchy with what actually seems like the lack of a plan.  Arnold does not end with a 
bang, but I would argue that he chooses not to.  He recognizes that culture has to be a 
genuine choice and that cultural change has to begin in the mind of the nation (C&A 
186).  It is a difficult sell, to be sure, to promote education before action at a time when 
action is held so far above intelligence.  However, even here Arnold is optimistic, if not 
desperate to believe, that there is a place for him and his culture as he moves towards a 
figure or figures, the friends of culture, who have developed all sides of their nature in 
order to promote his culture.  Victorian society is indeed in danger if aestheticizing 
politics is all it takes to make workers go happily (and blindly) along with the decisions 
of those in power.  Arnold’s hope, then, is that culture will make obvious to those 
followers that those in power may have style but they lack greatness, and culture, which 
has both greatness and style.  Perhaps his need to explain away his seeming inaction 
while criticising the obsession with the actions of others causes Arnold to concentrate on 
it that much more.  That is, the second phase of his career, which focuses on religious 
writing, can as Carroll points out “best be interpreted as a microcosmic epoch of 
Hebraistic ‘concentration’ within Arnold’s own history” (85), and one could argue that 
this Hebraistic concentration leads Arnold to examine action and the best model to 
perform it. 
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Chapter Three: Faith, Culture and the Public Intellectual 
 
Literature and Dogma: An Essay Towards a Better Apprehension of the Bible 
(1873), although not Arnold’s only work on religion, is his major work on religion and 
the most popular of his works published in his lifetime.  Literature and Dogma follows 
St. Paul and Protestantism, an essay that directly followed Culture and Anarchy and in 
which Arnold undertook “to show that the doctrinal differences that separate the 
Dissenters from the Church are in fact founded on a misreading of Scripture, especially 
of St. Paul” (apRoberts 178).  Further to this first objective, R.H. Super argues that in St. 
Paul and Protestantism Arnold also sets out to demonstrate “that historically, in England, 
the Church had always had a strong disposition…toward Christian unity which should 
now dispose it to welcome the comprehension of Dissent and should dispose Dissent to 
regard the Church as its friend, not its enemy” (Super 80).  Both essays, however, share 
Arnold’s concern “to shape an argumentative tool that will go to the root of Christian 
theology and undercut all present positions” (DeLaura 102).  This tool is, of course, 
culture and we will discuss how Arnold’s cultural criticism discredits theology yet re-
establishes religion’s (particularly Christian) importance.  Or as Collini explains, “he 
[Arnold] called upon criticism to deliver the truth of the Bible from the clutches of the 
literalists and the pedants” (Arnold 100).  Another dominant theme of Literature and 
Dogma is Arnold’s “conception of religion’s developmental or evolutionary nature” 
(Trilling 331).  That is, Arnold argues that although religion comes to mean different 
things as people’s consciousness of it changes, this does not necessarily signify religion’s 
increasing irrelevance; rather, it signifies a growing relevance and necessity of religion 
for a healthy society.  A critical perception is necessary to see religion’s relevance.  Also, 
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we can directly connect this to Arnold’s argument for the necessity of culture as a 
historically useful activity in preparing for the next phase of human development as he 
asserts “the necessity of the law of righteousness” (Trilling 331; emphasis his).  
Connected to the idea and importance of righteousness, which will be explained further 
later in this chapter, is its grandeur.  The idea of religion’s or righteousness’ grandeur, 
with its both aesthetic and imperialistic implications, can be connected to Arnold’s final 
claim for the exemplary and transformative force of critical judgement or culture in 
improving standards.          
In Literature and Dogma Arnold develops his cultural critique more fully still in 
the context of belief.  Arnold is, by this stage in his career, known to use art and faith as 
primary sources of socialization and education.  Here, we can trace Arnold’s claims about 
the importance of critical perception, the necessity of criticism as a historically useful 
activity in preparing for the next phase of human development, and the exemplary and 
transformative force of critical judgement in improving standards (ethical and political as 
well as cultural).  As Trilling points out, “criticism demands that intelligence be not acrid, 
that it go hand in hand with ‘moral balance’ and ‘nobleness of soul and character’” (208), 
and I will argue that in Literature and Dogma this claim is fully realized.  This book 
stresses the inwardness of “man,” feeling, emotion, but does so from a position 
emphatically that of a public intellectual concerned to teach several publics.   
The earlier claim that Matthew Arnold is contradiction is not less true with regard 
to his religious writings.  As apRoberts explains about these writings,  
secularists have sometimes felt nervous about them, suspecting a frowsty 
‘Victorian’ interest, and even—since the works profess to be Christian—an 
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indecent supernaturalism; while supernaturalists have been nervous about the 
secular approach and the rationalism.  (vii)  
Literature and Dogma is just one of these religious writings which, due to the complexity 
of the topic and argument, make both secularists and supernaturalists nervous.   I would 
concede, however, DeLaura’s broad claim which states that Arnold’s object in Literature 
and Dogma is “to develop a religious position, for the masses, which is nontheistic and 
yet draws upon the imaginative and emotional fullness of specifically Christian and hence 
Biblical sources” (102).  Arnold does this by applying culture, knowing the best that is 
thought and said in the world, to religion and then publishing a shorter, popular edition of 
his work which is reproduced in the 1895 Macmillan edition.  
 More specifically, just as Culture and Anarchy emerged out of Arnold’s need to 
address four main objections to “Anarchy and Authority,” Literature and Dogma 
emerged out of what Trilling calls “four important considerations” (317).  These 
considerations stemmed from things that Arnold said, did, or wrote and which he feels he 
must address: 
He had attacked the religion of Dissent as a source of political discord and he 
must now show, on grounds of doctrine and of ecclesiastical polity, why 
Puritanism need no longer be schismatic from the national Church.  He had 
spoken—‘in a hasty moment,’ says T.S. Eliot—of the will of God which is the 
ultimate sanction of the idea of the State and now he must demonstrate the 
existence and nature of that God and that will.  He had based government on the 
‘possible Socrates’ in each man’s breast and he must show how that Socrates 
might be educed….And last, he had not yet settled scores with his youthful 
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cosmological problems….[He needed] to rescue the world from the cheerless 
conclusions of science and to establish Joy.”  (Trilling 318)       
Certainly this is no small task for Arnold.  However, Literature and Dogma, by further 
developing Arnold’s three claims which we discussed in the previous two chapters, 
succeeds in developing his cultural critique and theory of religion-literature (apRoberts 
239) that leads us so appropriately into the figure and functions of the public intellectual. 
 Arnold’s claim for the importance of critical perception for improving standards 
can be connected to a need to understand why he could not let go of faith.  DeLaura 
smartly highlights a passage from Arnold’s “The Study of Poetry” (1888) which I would 
argue explains, in part, why Arnold could not let go of faith: 
The future of poetry is immense, because in poetry, where it is worthy of its high 
destinies, our race, as time goes on, will find an ever surer and surer stay.  There 
is not a creed which is not shaken, not an accredited dogma which is not shown to 
be questionable, not a received tradition which does not threaten to dissolve.  Our 
religion has materialised itself in the fact, in the supposed fact; it has attached its 
emotion to the fact, and now the fact is failing it.  But for poetry the idea is 
everything; the rest is a world of illusion, of divine illusion.  Poetry attaches its 
emotion to the idea; the idea is the fact.  The strongest part of our religion to-day 
is its unconscious poetry.  (EC 1-2)  (DeLaura 197) 
DeLaura identifies this passage as “Arnold’s most important statement on the quasi-
religious function of poetry in the modern world” (139).  Here it is not religion itself 
which is failing it is that religion has lost its imaginative element by being materialised in 
the fact.  Arnold recognized religion’s poetry and its practical applications to a society 
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that was in need of hope.  DeLaura also highlights Pater who said that “Dogmas are 
precious as memorials of a class of sincere and beautiful spirits, who, in a past age of 
humanity struggled with many tears, if not for true knowledge, yet for a noble and 
elevated happiness. That struggle is the substance, the dogma only its shadowy 
expression”  (DeLaura 197).  Indeed dogma has its use in that it is produced by a desire 
to understand, and curiosity is at the very heart of Arnold’s culture.  However, despite the 
possible sympathies for dogma, “for Arnold, [dogma] always runs the risk of its self-
righteousness and absoluteness” (apRoberts 279).  We must note here Arnold’s modest 
but determined exploration of his subtitle, An Essay Towards a Better Apprehension of 
the Bible and the implied opposition between literature and dogma.  As in Culture and 
Anarchy with its undeniable implication of mutual exclusion—one has either culture OR 
anarchy—Literature and Dogma suggests the same and asks the reader to choose 
literature.  Although Arnold had no tolerance for dogma, which religion had become, he 
could not let go of faith and therefore he set out to explain why the Bible was important 
and to establish it as authoritative and useful literature.   
A literary sensibility and a critical perception save religion from becoming 
dogma, a distorted and grotesque concept, by opposing any absolute or final religious 
truth.  That is, it challenges Arnold’s Hebraism, the one-sided and limiting view of the 
religious.  As Walters puts it so eloquently: 
No addition of texts, no accumulation of knowledge will dissolve the distortions 
and perversions of a comprehension that arises from a devotion to and embrace of 
‘absolute and final truth’.  Fundamentally, the Puritans suffer from 
fundamentalism—not a shortage of knowledge but a type of knowing, which, as 
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Arnold says directly, amounts to not knowing at all….The very notion of such a 
‘Truth with a capital “T”’—the denial…--is manifestly anti-cultural.  The 
existence (whatever that would mean) of a single eternal truth is the death of 
culture.  If the answer to the question is fundamental and therefore utterly 
unquestionable, the result will be not cultivation but preservation—and even that 
only in the form of mummification, which is to say a mere veil over active 
putrefaction.  There cannot be a culture of fundamentalism (in any form, whether 
religious or otherwise)….Dogma is not the embodiment of culture but rather its 
entombment. (Walters 356; emphasis his) 
A critical perception shows us the danger of pretentiously adhering to a single and 
absolute truth.  In Literature and Dogma Arnold says that “the man who believes that his 
truth on religious matters is so absolutely the truth, that…he cannot but do good with it, 
is…always a man whose truth is half blunder and wholly useless” (vi).  Clearly 
implicated here is dogma’s social indictment and its uselessness.  Arnold is showing how 
the improper perception of religion can render it useless as an agent which had been and 
could be again “the most important of the efforts by which the human race has 
manifested its impulse to perfect itself” (C&A 61).    
 Dogma, religion’s Achilles’ heel, fails in large part due to its literal interpretation 
of the Bible.  Max Müller, a friend of Arnold’s at Oxford and an accomplished student of 
comparative philology and myth, explains a sentiment that Arnold arguably shared: 
We shall no longer try to force a literal sense on words which, if interpreted literally, 
must lose their true and original purport, we shall no longer interpret the Law and the 
Prophets as if they had been written in the English of our own century, but read them 
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in a truly historical spirit, prepared for the many difficulties, undismayed by many 
contradictions, which so far from disproving the authenticity, become…the strongest 
confirmatory evidence of the age, the genuineness, and the real truth of ancient 
sacred books.   (Müller 206-7) 
Arnold says himself that he is “quite willing…to call the Bible and its religion all-
important” (L&D viii) and would therefore also be willing to show how the difficulties 
and contradictions which Müller mentions can indeed be confirmatory evidence of the 
real truth of this ancient and sacred book.   In order to “see” the Bible, to see the object as 
in itself it really is, Arnold stresses the importance of a critical perception. 
A critical perception is, for Arnold, a “pure” perception similar to the “pure” 
knowledge that Walters speaks of which “entails an endless, infinite pursuit”(354) and 
maintains its own endless and infinite characteristics.  It seems apparent then, just as 
Arnold’s Culture and Anarchy suggests a choice—you either have culture or you have 
anarchy—Literature and Dogma suggests the same.  Moreover, we sense Arnold’s 
suggestion of choosing culture over anarchy and literature over dogma; however, we also 
sense that by posing this question (culture or anarchy/literature or dogma?) Arnold is 
posing “the enduring, fundamental, essential question [and] Arnold allows us to see that 
culture can indeed be the ‘glue’ that binds together a multicultural (and multireligious) 
society—but only insofar as it severs any attachment to the particularization and 
positionality of cultural identity and persists only as the dis-position of the critical 
question” (Walters 365).  For Arnold, a pure perception recognizes that the “best” place 
to be is no place at all, free from position and open to the idea of the eternal question and 
the search for a better understanding. 
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The pure perception, the critical perception, recognizes the necessity of the 
imagination, of metaphor.  Arnold argues against theology in that it claims to rely on a 
literal interpretation of the Bible.  He argues that religion will fail if it is based on fact 
because as our intellect increases we recognize the fallibility of faith that is based on fact.  
apRoberts points out that Arnold, in his discussion of morality and religion, identifies a 
difference of degree between these two ideas (191-2).  In Literature and Dogma Arnold 
does this, apRoberts says, by combining, challenging, and itemizing terms and ideas as 
either literal or metaphorical.  He contrasts these two ideas by setting them up against 
each other.  For example, he sets up a prosy Old Testament proverb (literal) against the 
poetry of the Old Testament (metaphorical), another Old Testament proverb (literal) 
against a poetic Psalm passage (metaphorical), a scientific statement (literal) against a 
Wordsworth metaphor (metaphorical) (apRoberts 193).  The argument or strategy 
implicates metaphor as the element common to both religion and poetry.  Moreover, as 
apRoberts points out, Arnold invites us to test on our psyches the effects of group A 
(literal) as compared to the effects of group B (metaphorical) in order to oblige us  
to recognize the emotive power of B in the Latinate sense of emoveo, having the 
power to dislodge, to move, to change men; to recognize that all group B items 
are metaphorical; to analyze them as metaphor; to consider that the pretense or 
approximation of metaphor carries more meaning than the literal; to realize that 
these expressions do not lose in power when we realize they are ‘not true’, but 
they gain in power rather, and that to misunderstand these metaphors as literal or 
scientific statement is to miss the power and the point.  (194) 
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Like his juxtaposition of literary touchstones, Arnold juxtaposes the literal and the 
metaphorical and therefore asks the reader to question already held perceptions.  What 
Arnold is demonstrating above by this comparison, is the discursive, affective and ethical 
functions of criticism or culture.  That is, criticism promotes a critical perception which, 
in this case, accepts the validity of the metaphorical and more generally the figurative and 
the poetic, while also illuminating and adding significance to the metaphor.  Arnold asks 
the reader to examine how he or she feels about a matter and presses him or her to “dwell 
upon it” (L&D 21).  Here, criticism is at work “making order in the chaos of one’s 
impressions” (L&D 22).  This practice of concentration encourages an outcome of 
“seeing things as they are” (C&A 59) and promotes a critical perception or notion of a 
“whole self…a best self…a permanent self” (L&D 22), which is Arnold’s understanding 
of the chief focus and duty of criticism or culture.  We know that he is talking about 
criticism or culture because he pinpoints the difference between a “habitual dwelling on 
the rules [of conduct]” (L&D 22) and “that constant turning them over in the mind…that 
sense of their beneficence” (L&D 22 emphasis mine).  Here, the perception does not 
simply arrive out of habit, but out of the constant application of criticism, which results in 
the critical perception.  Access to and time spent with culture, the best that has been 
known and thought in the world, prepares the mind to exert itself to discover the 
connection between the literal and figurative meanings, between what is called literature 
and what is called dogma.   
The complications of language show the necessity of critical perception. 
Critical perception is important to viewing the Bible as literature not dogma, and in doing 
so, Arnold is re-establishing the Bible’s utility and authority.  Northrop Frye’s The 
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Educated Imagination simplifies and explains what I would argue Arnold has already 
identified.  Frye distinguishes between three different types of English language or 
reasons for using words (Educated Imagination 6).  There is ordinary language, used for 
conversation, monologue and self-expression; working or technical language, which is 
how we communicate on a social level; and finally there is the language of the 
imagination, which produces literary language such as poetry, plays, and novels.  He then 
goes on to distinguish between the arts and the sciences.  Sciences begin with the world 
in which we live and try to explain its laws using the imagination (mental constructs of 
models).  The arts are different.  Art “begins with the world we construct, not with the 
world we see.  It starts with the imagination, and then works towards ordinary 
experience:  that is, it tries to make itself as convincing and recognizable as it can” 
(Educated Imagination 6).  I would say, then, that the Bible is an early book, one of the 
first works of literature, that brings together the arts and the sciences and this is part of 
the reason why Arnold stressed its importance.  Is it both?  Using myth and metaphor it 
explains the kind of world the people of the Book live in and how we are to learn from it, 
yet it also discusses an ideal world, a heavenly place that only exists in the realm of the 
imagination in the sense that it is not the present world we live in.   
Frye also says that “the language of literature is associative: it uses figure of 
speech, like the simile and the metaphor, to suggest an identity between the human mind 
and the world outside it, that identity being what the imagination is chiefly concerned 
with” (EI 12).  The Bible, as a form of literature, uses this language and is therefore 
suggesting God (specifically the Christian version) as the identity between the human 
mind and the world outside it.  It takes the same type of mental exertion to comprehend 
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God as it does to understand Arnold’s culture, and understandings of each will change 
over time.  These understandings are, for Arnold, only useful if it is understood that they 
are provisional, not dogmatic.  The critical perception is important to this understanding 
of culture as it gives the Bible its literary status while re-establishing its authority and 
social benefits.  In The Great Code, Frye’s main text on this subject as it claims to be a 
study of the Bible from the point of view of a literary critic (Great Code xi), he says that 
the Bible has verbal structures which remind the reader of myths —by myth Frye means 
plot or narrative (Great Code 31)—and that the “oratorical style of the Bible…unit[es] 
the poetic and the concerned” (Great Code 49), which gives the Bible its authority and 
which highlights its social benefits.  That is, “as a story, it [the Bible] is re-created in 
literature; as a story with a specific social function, it is a program of action for a specific 
society” (Great Code 49).  A critical perception “sees” the usefulness in giving the Bible 
a literary status as it regains its authority and social influence.  Although it may seem 
sacrilegious to some to give the Bible a literary status (there are those that would argue 
that it is divine only and that it cannot be both literary and divine), I would argue that it is 
only when we understand the Bible as an example of literature that it can maintain its 
permanent relevance.  As a literary work, which uses simile and metaphor  “to suggest an 
identity between the human mind and the world outside it” (Educated Imagination 12), it 
maintains a permanence because as Frye points out, metaphor is important as it remains 
even when belief ceases to exist (Educated Imagination 13).   Here, we have literary 
rather than divine inspiration, which in Victorian England is crucial to re-establishing the 
Bible’s significance in personal and social life.  Although the Bible’s teachings may not 
have divine significance for some, it maintains its imaginative and literary significance, 
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and this state too, is provisional.  The Bible as literature is not dogma because the 
imagination and its imaginative quality, its literary quality, does not allow it to be.  
Culture is the chain between the imaginative, ideal world and the real world.  As 
apRoberts states, “culture may be the saving grace, which makes sense of our lives and 
constitutes the chief fact about ourselves as human beings” (Arnold and God viii).  And 
culture, when connected to religion, implies a doing, not simply a knowing.  Also, 
religion’s stress on conduct gets us away from simply looking at the world to doing 
something about it, which can be connected to Arnold’s next claim on the necessity of 
criticism/culture in the next phase of human development.  
Arnold’s next broad claim argues for the necessity of criticism as a historically 
useful activity in preparing for the next phase of human development.   Like his father, 
Arnold clearly insisted that religion was a necessary part of people’s growth towards 
perfection.  It follows then that religion, like criticism, would be viewed as a useful and 
necessary activity in preparing for the next phase of human development.  As Trilling 
explains, “of equal importance with Arnold’s idea of the moral essence of all religion, is 
his conception of religion’s developmental or evolutionary nature, a dominant theme in 
Literature and Dogma” (331).  Although Arnold argues for the necessity of religion in 
human development, more precisely he argues that the criticism of religion is a 
historically useful activity in preparing for the next phase of human development.  
Trilling states that “Literature and Dogma is in large part the history of the religious idea, 
both in this inversion and its true and healthy growth” (334).  Trilling is correct.  
However, we must remember that history and criticism are very close in effect with 
Higher Criticism of the Bible and the reconstruction of revelation as poetry, history, and 
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myth.  Therefore, I would argue that Literature and Dogma is also a criticism of the 
religious idea which is necessary for its true and healthy growth. 
  Although there was disagreement about whether it was religion itself that 
changed and evolved or whether it was our conception of a firm idea that changed and 
evolved, I would argue that Arnold was more aligned with the latter argument.  Indeed, it 
could be argued that criticism is necessary as that tool which manages and challenges the 
ever-changing idea of religion.  However, given Arnold’s open acknowledgement of 
Newman’s influence on his religious thought, it seems plausible that Arnold would align 
himself with Newman’s “conception of religion as an Idea originally and completely 
given” (Trilling 332) and his claim that the Idea itself does not change “but the human 
understanding of it grows and exfoliates” (332).  Moreover, Newman says that  
from the nature of the human mind, time is necessary for the full comprehension 
and perfection of great ideas; and that the highest and most wonderful truths, 
though communicated to the world once for all by inspired teachers, could not be 
comprehended all at once by the recipients, but, as being received and transmitted 
by minds not inspired and through media which were human, have required only 
the longer time and deeper thought for their full elucidation. (21)  
In this passage, one could easily replace “time” with “criticism,” which is “necessary for 
the full comprehension and perfection of great ideas” (Newman 21), in order to see more 
fully the similarity between Newman’s views and Arnold’s.  However, Trilling points out 
an important difference between these two learned scholars.  Whereas Newman sees 
development in a straight line, Arnold sees it as undulant (Trilling 333).  This point may 
not seem worth mentioning except that a development, which occurs in a straight line 
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may require less effort.  That is, Newman assumes that the passage of time alone is 
enough to bring society to a better understanding of religion.  Arnold, however, 
recognizes that a society without culture, a society that does not work to know the best 
that is known and thought, will very likely remain mediocre and perhaps even lose its 
way; or when religion no longer makes sense because of scientific knowledge, a society 
without imagination, without culture, will simply discard religion, what Arnold argues is 
“the greatest and most important of the efforts by which the human race has manifested 
its impulse to perfect itself” (C&A 61).  We must note here Arnold’s distinction between 
the bad or damaging alterations of doubt, which are captured in his poetry and which are, 
I would argue, a result of a belief in dogma, and the invigorating fluctuations of a living 
faith which is “the being able to cleave to a power of goodness appealing to our high and 
real self, not to our lower and apparent self” (L&D 215; emphasis his).   As Trilling 
further explains, because Arnold recognized that the human spirit was affected by the 
conditions of the times and therefore responded differently at different times, Arnold’s 
understanding required that he undertake research in both psychology and anthropology 
(333).  Arnold’s concept of undulating development, which heaves and surges, rises and 
falls, and which is unlike Newman’s concept of linear development, requires a tool to 
keep it on a reasonable and present course.  For example, in Literature and Dogma 
Arnold recalls a time in history when considering individual books of the Bible, “degrees 
of value were still felt, and all parts of the Bible did not stand on the same footing, and 
were not taken equally” (xxiv).  He goes on to explain that in addition to the books that 
are in every Bible now, there were many books which were rejected because “a true 
critical sense” (xxiv) was at work.  Moreover, he suggests that because the books were 
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not placed in the Canon of Scripture based on merit alone, that criticism has yet more 
work to do.  However, Arnold states that “the whole discussion died out, not because the 
matter was sifted and settled and a perfect Canon of Scripture deliberately formed; it died 
out as mediaeval ignorance deepened, and because there was no longer knowledge or 
criticism enough left in the world to keep such a discussion alive” (L&D xxv).  Therefore 
Arnold argues for a balance of emotion and intellect—this balance can be achieved by 
culture—and human development is in danger of massive digression without the 
necessary tool to bring it back and to prepare it for the next phase of human development.   
 Criticism is a necessary tool for the next phase of human development also 
because it saves the Bible from being discarded altogether or from becoming entombed 
by dogmatism.  Arnold is writing in a time of religious crisis when a literal interpretation 
of the Bible clashed with entrenched habits of faith and pastoral authority.  Historically 
people witnessed contradictions to their faith such as prosperity of the sinner, the rise and 
power of great unrighteous kingdoms, and an unsuccessful Israel (L&D 60-3).  Moreover, 
he says that in the process of human development the masses had lost their awe for 
religion.  The result was that “many of the most successful, energetic, and ingenious of 
the artisan class…[were] now found either of themselves rejecting the Bible altogether, 
or following teachers who [told] them the Bible is an exploded superstition” (L&D vi).  
Therefore he revisits culture and its claim to knowing the best that is thought and known 
in the world.  Here, Arnold discusses how letters, or criticism, provide a tactful and fair-
minded way in which to study the Bible (L&D 46).   
Arnold also discusses language and how our language is inadequate to describe God 
(L&D 35-36).  Language in the Bible is literary, not scientific—it requires imagination 
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for its productive interpretation.  Arnold states that “by knowing letters, by becoming 
conversant with the best that has been thought and said in the world, we become 
acquainted not only with history, but also with the scope and powers, of the instruments 
men employ in thinking and speaking” (L&D 46-7).  With appropriate interpretation, 
which comes from cultural critique, the Bible, that “ideal of perfected human 
consciousness” (DeLaura 109), gains authority.  Moreover, culture leads to a “justness of 
perception” (L&D xxi), which is crucial to reading the Bible as literature and not dogma.  
A proper reading of the Bible identifies crucial matters of conduct and morality contained 
within its pages, and the social implications here are obvious.  Arnold reasserts the 
Bible’s importance as the only thing, with its “comforting and uplifting poetic testimony 
to righteousness” (DeLaura 105 emphasis his), that can provide emotional and 
imaginative support for the masses’ practice of morality (DeLaura 105). We must 
remember that, for Arnold, the members of the masses’ are members of the middle class 
and most likely to produce public intellectuals.  Therefore, Arnold uses cultural criticism 
to save the Bible from being completely discarded or deadeningly preserved in order to 
reassert its moral and social benefits for the next phase of human development.     
Finally, culture or criticism is necessary as a historically useful activity in preparing 
for the next phase of human development, as it makes the activity that one undertakes 
useful.  Arnold introduces the idea of conduct here.  He talks about distractions (23) and 
how they prevent one from becoming religious (in the dispositional, processive sense 
rather than the dogmatic sense) because we are unable to dwell upon important religious 
matters, we are unable to attain a critical perception.  Arnold is again encouraging useful 
activity which will prepare us for the next phase of human development.  The change 
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from Culture and Anarchy to Literature and Dogma is not necessarily the focus on 
conduct, or what the right conduct is, but what the source of the right conduct is.  In 
Culture and Anarchy Arnold’s source is culture; that culture can in fact lead to 
perfection.  However, in Literature and Dogma Arnold says that “the generality of 
mankind…[gets] as far as the notion of morals or conduct” (L&D 24).  Therefore, 
Arnold’s faith in culture does not recede; rather, he sees culture’s and criticism’s 
usefulness in better understanding perfection, which is, he would argue, found in the 
Bible.  Moreover, righteousness, found by a responsible and critical reading of the Bible, 
is key to human perfection.  According to Arnold, even the righteous, although they 
succeed farther than the general public in understanding righteousness, favour conduct 
that is “capable…of almost infinitely different degrees of force and energy in the 
performance of it…and these degrees may vary from day to day” (L&D 25).  The 
insinuation is that we alone cannot habitually practice right conduct, in which criticism 
plays a large part.  That is, as Arnold says, “there is so much that belongs to the not 
ourselves in conduct…and the more we value it, attend to it, the more we feel this” (26 
emphasis his).  He does acknowledge the different results of such a connection, but 
insists that the connection of individuals to the not ourselves often results in right conduct 
with all of its imperialistic and aesthetic implications.   
Every one knows of what differences of operation men’s dealing with this power 
has in different places and times shown itself capable; how here they have been 
moved by the not ourselves to a cruel terror, there to a timid religiosity, there 
again to a play of imagination; almost always, however, connecting with it, by 
some string or other, conduct.  (26) 
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As Arnold expresses a critical view of the supra-personal, he is prescribing the “not 
ourselves” as a polemical tool or the tool with which to avoid doing as one likes, in order 
that one may do something useful that prepares for an advancement towards the next 
phase of human development.  He is not prescribing religion necessarily, but the idea of 
religion as culture sees it, and religion, as culture sees it, is a useful tool in preparing for 
the next phase of human development.   
The idea of religion’s or righteousness’ grandeur, with its both aesthetic and 
imperialistic implications, can be connected to Arnold’s final claim for the exemplary 
and transformative force of critical judgement or culture in improving standards.   Arnold 
recognizes religion’s beauty but feels that if religion is to be part of education, which 
Arnold feels is imperative for society’s improvement, it has to maintain its own 
disinterestedness.  DeLaura says that “the social end of education for Newman…was 
similar [to Arnold’s]: ‘it aims at raising the intellectual tone of society, at cultivating the 
public mind, at purifying the national taste, at supplying true principles to popular 
enthusiasm and fixed aims to popular aspiration, at giving enlargement and sobriety to 
the ideas of the age’” (DeLaura 69).  Arnold agreed with Newman that education (with 
culture at its core) was fundamental to society’s ethical, political and cultural 
improvement.  For Arnold, however, Christian teaching was to be the most important 
element of education as it raised ideals and required the imagination, and was what would 
increase education’s chances of having widespread social benefits.  But Arnold also 
recognized the danger of incorporating a dogmatic religion into the education system.  He 
felt that religion had been depreciated and tainted by representatives from dominant 
groups.  Therefore, culture is necessary to keep religion free from interest and to enable it 
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to regain its healthy authority and position in society and in education.  Arnold’s solution 
for anarchy is, of course, culture, and particularly in the case of religion’s role in 
educational institutions the State acts as the enemy of anarchy.  It is important to note, 
during Arnold’s time, the emergence of a public state system for the control of 
denominational schools and his involvement in this process (Trilling 185-8).  For Arnold, 
the State that is guided by culture acts as the critical perception saving the education 
system from dogmatic religion.  As Arnold so plainly puts it, “The State is of the religion 
of all its citizens, without the fanaticism of any of them” (C&A 154; emphasis his).   
Arnold’s engagement with ever fresh knowledge does not speak to knowing more 
(indeed he has always said that knowing more means nothing unless it is knowing the 
best that has been thought and said), but rather it does speak to a special type of knowing.  
The Bible is part of Arnold’s best that has been thought and said and indeed to him 
Christianity is “the greatest and happiest stroke ever yet made for human perfection.” 
(L&D 98).  But in his explanation as to why Christianity is the best effort made towards 
human perfection, Arnold challenges the reader to examine the Bible and Christianity 
critically and to see that Christianity rooted in culture rather than prophetic fulfillment or 
rigid providence is part of knowing better and improving standards.  He says “Prediction 
and miracle were attributed to it [Christianity] as its supports because of its grandeur, and 
because of the awe and admiration which it inspired” (L&D 98).  However, there is 
danger, Arnold warns, in fantastic accretions.  Religion, whose proof is reliant on 
prediction and miracle, is threatened with being discarded altogether. Arnold pushes us to 
know critically, to use critical judgement or culture as it enables us to read the Bible as 
literature—to be open to this fresh knowledge of it as our consciousness of it changes. 
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In Culture and Anarchy Arnold emphasizes the importance of improving 
standards internally and in Literature and Dogma this emphasis is more fully realized.  
Arnold shifts the focus from religion’s benefits to the social and national realms, to 
religion’s benefits in the personal and inner realms.  For Arnold, transformation must 
begin in the personal and private realm before it can become public.  Here is Arnold’s 
most remarkable and obvious shift to the figure of the critic, to the public intellectual.  As 
Trilling points out, “the religion of the Old Testament had been chiefly a matter of 
national and social conduct; the new datum of religion that Jesus brought was personal” 
(336).  Arnold also argues that “Jesus made his followers first look within and examine 
themselves…[and] self-examination, self-renouncement, and mildness were, therefore, 
the great means by which Jesus Christ renewed righteousness and religion” (L&D 81).   
The argument for personal transformation before public transformation is aligned with 
what Arnold argues in Culture and Anarchy when he stresses the importance of 
Hellenism, of ideas, of intelligence.   If Arnold’s Victorian society needed an example of 
the significant impact a person (divine or otherwise) who has sweetness and light could 
make, Jesus was it and Arnold was reminding them of Jesus’ significant public role. 
Finally, Arnold argues for culture’s importance in identifying what true 
righteousness really is, which will secure man’s [and woman’s] happiness and which is 
necessary for human perfection.  Arnold says that righteousness (specifically Christian), 
which is “the method and the secret and the sweet reasonableness of Jesus” (L&D 329) 
must be properly understood and that only culture can save it from being dogmatically 
misinterpreted.  Essentially, Arnold goes from showing the necessity of righteousness, to 
returning to the necessity of his culture.  Culture’s role here is twofold.  First, culture is 
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that tool necessary for the proper conception or understanding of Jesus as both an 
exemplary and transformative figure and as a public intellectual, and second, culture is 
embodied in the figure of Jesus as that critical perception which makes religion relevant.  
Jesus is both a figure who demonstrates historically useful activity in preparing for the 
next phase of human development and an exemplary and transformative force in 
improving standards.  This final claim goes back to Culture and Anarchy and Arnold’s 
idea of a best self.  I said before that culture acts as both the exemplary and the 
transformative force for improving standards as it encourages society to rest authority 
with a best self that requires continuous growing and becoming.  Jesus, as culture 
conceives him, gives us a concrete idea of what a best self, a public intellectual, should 
look like.  And in identifying with Jesus, and by connecting Arnold’s version of culture 
with Jesus as a figure who promotes culture, Arnold is creating that necessary space for 
himself. 
The idea of Jesus is the human idea of culture.  That is, Jesus, whether divine 
Saviour, or influential teacher, demonstrates what Arnold hopes culture can accomplish.  
In Culture and Anarchy we saw Arnold’s increasing preoccupation with Hebraism, and 
although Arnold stresses the need to put Hellenism first, to stress intelligence over action, 
he is not convinced that this will happen in Victorian society.  Moreover, I would argue 
that Arnold’s writing shifts towards the figure, towards “doing” because that is what 
society called for and because Arnold feared failing in print.  As apRoberts says, 
“Language, metaphor, and myth are bound to man’s [and woman’s] sociality—they are 
nothing if not shared” (228).  However, Arnold did not abandon his Hellenism and found 
in Jesus the perfect balance of both and the key to secure his future as critic.   
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 Conclusion 
 
As arguably “the most influential critic of his age” (Trilling 190), Matthew 
Arnold has indeed proven to be an influential model for the public intellectual currently 
in Canada and elsewhere.  In his three works explored in this thesis, we can see not only 
Arnold’s interest in writing, but also his sense of duty to society, particularly in areas of 
ethics, politics, and culture.  Moreover, perhaps as a result of significant dissatisfaction 
with Victorian society, we see Arnold stressing the importance of culture in promoting a 
healthy society. His connection of literature and life through the medium of criticism is 
key to understanding his shift of mission from poet and educational bureaucrat to that of 
public intellectual. 
What began in “The Function of Criticism at the Present Time” and Culture and 
Anarchy as the promotion of culture finds its best exemplar in Jesus.  That is, we must 
note the shift from culture, identified as criticism in “The Function of Criticism at the 
Present Time,” to culture as a characteristic and practice necessary to seeing things as 
they really are and a concept which can secure happiness.  The shift thus accomplished in 
Culture and Anarchy gives way in Arnold’s turn to culture as embodied in the figure of 
Jesus as the ultimate public intellectual in Literature and Dogma.  Critical judgement or 
culture is embodied in a person, in Jesus, and the effect this has on the masses (note the 
strongly social as well as spiritual implications again) is significant, life-changing and 
arguably permanent as Jesus has become a crucial historical, if not divine, figure in the 
world.   
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Despite Arnold’s return to faith and religious writing, he was devoted to culture 
above all else as, for Arnold, only it possessed the disinterestedness which could satisfy 
an increasingly secular public while maintaining its allegiance to the imagination.  Even 
in his promotion of a specifically Christian faith, if not for him certainly for the masses, 
he recognized culture as the tool necessary for “apprehending this God of the Bible 
rightly and not wrongly” (L&D 350).  Essentially culture is necessary to avoid anarchy, 
to ensure you have literature and not dogma, and as Arnold felt increasing frustration 
both privately and publicly, his turn to culture is an attempt to save society and himself.  
Whatever his success in his own times, Arnold’s example of connecting life to literature 
and the promoting of culture has lived on inside and outside the academy. 
Today we can see Arnold’s continuing influence in the lives of modern day public 
intellectuals.  We see his claims, for the necessity of culture, for the necessity of cultural 
criticism as a historically useful activity in preparing for the next phase of human 
development, and for the exemplary and transformative force of critical judgement in 
improving ethical, political, as well as cultural standards.  Moreover, his popular phrases, 
“sweetness and light”, “pursuit of perfection”, “disinterestedness”, are echoed, eschewed, 
expanded upon and connected to new, if not original, claims.  For example in Edward 
Said and the work of the critic: speaking truth to power, edited by Paul Bové, Arnold’s 
“disinterestedness” emerges.  When asked, in an interview with Jaqueline Rose, if the 
intellectual should cease criticizing authority and take on a role of support when the 
previously oppressed take over authority (27), Said responds by saying that “the role of 
the intellectual is never to give unconditional support” (Bové 27).  In Colonial Desire: 
Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race, Robert J.C Young invokes and deconstructs 
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Arnold’s “culture,” claiming that “Arnold’s theory of culture is in fact fully immersed 
within the ideology of his time” (58) in order to demonstrate how contemporary cultural 
theories of post-colonialism and ethnicity operate in complicity with nineteenth-century 
patterns of thought and definitions of race and culture.  Or we can look at more politically 
minded public intellectuals such as Susan Sontag and Michael Ignatieff, both human 
rights activists, who felt it their duty as public intellectuals to comment on the events of 
September 11 by challenging the action (or reaction) of those in government.  More 
specifically, Ignatieff, as an example of a Canadian public intellectual, has many qualities 
which Arnold argues a critic should have.  That is, he is university educated and socially 
engaged, culturally cosmopolitan, has held academic positions at Harvard, Oxford and 
Cambridge, and was director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy (Wikipedia).  
Ignatieff has also made his mark in print as an author and journalist, as a documentary 
filmmaker, and is now even more politically engaged as a Canadian member of 
parliament and deputy leader of the Liberal opposition in the House.  Ignatieff is 
explicitly and severely secular in his own sense of vocation, but his ethical concerns and 
critique of anarchy may represent in part what Arnold looked for in a liberalism of the 
future.   
I would also argue that Arnold’s contribution to the idea of the public intellectual 
(in very broad and general terms) has led to subcategories or very narrow categories of 
the public intellectual.  For example, some even more specific classifications now include 
the secular or liminal intellectual, the critical intellectual, the expert intellectual, the 
specific intellectual, the general intellectual, the private intellectual and so on.  This can 
lead to confusion in the midst of intellectual and social ferment.  However, as Posner 
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indicates,  “the term ‘public intellectual’ [can] be defined in a way that would demarcate 
a coherent albeit broad body of expressive activity” (2) and that the work of public 
intellectuals can broadly include (or at the very least should include) “clarifying issues, 
exposing the errors of other public intellectuals, drawing attention to neglected issues, 
and vivifying public debate” (3).  The work that Posner pushes for is, I would argue, 
exactly what Arnold was working out as the necessary work of criticism, the critic, and 
what I would identify as the public intellectual.  And Arnold does so with courage and 
critical acumen, and within the frame of an anti-dogmatic Christian faith.   
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